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Texas Groundwater and Tragically Stable “Crossovers”
Zachary Bray*
ABSTRACT
One recurring question in the academic literature on common-pool
resources relates to the persistence of “tragic” commons regimes—systems
that encourage, or at least tolerate, the inefficient, wasteful, hazardous, or
unfair exploitation of a resource that is easily accessed for and diminished
by individual use and consumption. Of course, not all commons are tragic:
some common-pool resources invite individual access in efficient, fair, and
durable ways. Yet many commonly held resources do lie under systems of
governance that are not just tragic but persistently and stubbornly so.
Often the tragic aspects of such commons regimes are well known; indeed,
for some tragic commons regimes, they are almost self-evident.
Such persistent and obvious tragic commons regimes invite the obvious
question: why do they endure? Some persistent tragic commons regimes are
particularly puzzling in this respect, because at times they may appear to
hesitate right on the verge of positive transformation, only to revert back to
tragic stasis when apparent moments of change present themselves. In this
Article, I claim that Texas groundwater law represents just such a
persistent and puzzling tragic commons regime.
Recent literature has pointed out the ways in which tragically stable
commons regimes can resist forces of change and emerging values from
rival institutions and analogous commons contexts. In this Article, I
pursue a related line of inquiry to examine a different and previously
under-examined phenomenon. Using Texas groundwater as an example, I
show how an internally dynamic commons regime on the cusp of positive
change can be tragically stabilized by values and legal doctrines drawn
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from rival institutions and analogous commons contexts. I then argue that
unless this tragic crossover is decisively broken, the law and institutions that
govern Texas groundwater are likely to remain tragically stable.
I. I GNORANCE AND T HE R OOTS OF G ROUNDWATER L AW .......................... 1290
II. T HE E VOLUTION OF GROUNDWATER L AW IN T EXAS ............................. 1289
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B. The Rule of Capture for Groundwater in Texas .............................................. 1299
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IV. R ECENT E XAMPLES OF THE T RAGIC C ROSSOVER : E DWARDS A QUIFER
A UTHORITY V. D AY AND B EYOND ................................................. 1326
V. C ONCLUSION ................................................................................... 1345

INTRODUCTION
Texas has a state water plan, which begins by admitting that
there is not enough water in the state and continues to predict that
water shortages will probably get much worse. 1 While both the
admission and the prediction may seem to lack some of the spirit of
the Alamo, the state’s history reveals a widespread recognition and
acceptance of water scarcity and the limits it imposes on human
activity. 2 Historically, awareness of the consequences of water scarcity
has been particularly acute in Texas at times of drought, 3 and this
1. TEX. WATER DEV. BD., 2012 STATE WATER PLAN, III (noting that “[t]he primary
message of the [State Water Plan] is a simple one: In serious drought conditions, Texas does not and
will not have enough water,” and detailing the “economic losses likely to occur if these water supply
needs cannot be met”). The 2012 plan is the current plan; the Texas Water Development Board is
required by statute to develop a state water plan every five years.
2. See JAMES A. MICHENER, TEXAS v (1985) (“Water, not oil, is the lifeblood of
Texas . . . .”); Anne Dingus, More Colorful Texas Sayings, TEX. MONTHLY, Dec. 1994 (listing, inter
alia, numerous allegedly timeworn Texas expressions regarding water scarcity, such as “[it is s]o dry
the trees are bribing the dogs” and “[it is s]o dry my duck don’t [sic] know how to swim”).
3. E.g., CHARLES R. PORTER, JR., SPANISH WATER, ANGLO WATER: EARLY DEVELOPMENT
IN SAN ANTONIO 3–21 (2009); see also In re Adjudication of the Water Rights of Upper
Guadalupe Segment of Guadalupe River Basin, 642 S.W.2d 438, 441 (Tex. 1982) (“The story of
water law in Texas is also the story of its droughts.”). Texas history and Texas water law have been
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decade has brought severe drought to Texas, much as it has to many
other states. 4
The story of water use and water scarcity in Texas has been marked
particularly deeply by issues related to groundwater. 5 Groundwater is an
important component of water supply in many U.S. jurisdictions, but it
is especially important in Texas, where groundwater withdrawals provide
over half of the total water used in the state. 6 Groundwater withdrawals
in much of Texas have long exceeded many of the relevant aquifers’
recharge rate, but although conflicts over groundwater “mining” of
some particularly high-profile aquifers in Texas are decades old, the full
extent of the state’s groundwater depletion has only recently begun to
attract appropriate levels of attention. 7
Far more attention has traditionally been paid to Texas’s unusual
doctrinal approach to groundwater, especially by scholars and
commentators outside the state. Although groundwater law is far from
uniform across U.S. jurisdictions, 8 Texas, with its retention of the old

particularly marked by the state’s propensity for frequent and severe droughts, but the connection
between periods of drought and heightened interest in water scarcity and water law issues is a
well-studied phenomenon not limited to Texas. See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, Water Use Permits
in a Riparian State: Problems and Proposals, 66 KY. L.J. 191, 191 (1978) (noting that the
prolonged drought of the summer of 1977 “focused public attention on long-range water
resource problems” across the country).
4. See, e.g., Michael Wines, West’s Drought and Growth Intensify Conflict Over Water Rights,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2014, at A1 (using a vignette from Mumford, Texas, to introduce and
summarize water conflicts throughout the U.S. during recent widespread and severe drought).
5. Groundwater is water that has “seep[ed] into the ground much like a glass of water
poured onto a pile of sand.” E.g., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, What Is Ground Water?, Open File
Report 93-643, April 2001, available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/1993/ofr93-643/. Some water
that seeps through the surface continues to pass downward through the ground until it reaches a
relatively impermeable layer, at which point it fills the empty spaces and cracks in the earth above that
impermeable layer. The water that fills these subterranean empty spaces and cracks is called
groundwater, and the area of permeable subterranean material through which groundwater can easily
move is called an aquifer. When water seeps down from precipitation on the surface to fill the empty
spaces in an aquifer, it is known as “recharge” water, and the aquifer is said to be “recharging.” Id.
6. See, e.g., Sriroop Chaudhuri & Srinivasulu Ale, Long-term (1930-2010) Trends in
Groundwater Levels in Texas: Influences of Soils, Landcover and Water Use, 490 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T
379, 380 (2014) (gathering authorities and statistics and noting that in Texas, “groundwater
provided 60% of the total . . . water used in the state”). In the U.S. generally, groundwater supplies
roughly 20% of the total water withdrawn daily. See, e.g., ROBERT ADLER, ROBIN K. CRAIG & NOAH
D. HALL, MODERN WATER LAW 173 (2013).
7. E.g., Niina Heikkinen, The Future of Texas’ Groundwater Supply May Be Precarious,
Experts
Say,
CLIMATEWIRE
(July
23,
2014),
available
at
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060003333. For a study of decreasing groundwater levels in
Texas over the past eight decades, see generally Chaudhuri & Ale, supra note 6.
8. See, e.g., ADLER ET AL., supra note 6, at 178–79 (summarizing the various groundwater
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common-law rule of capture, is widely considered to be the biggest
outlier. 9 Most scholars and commentators who have reviewed the issue,
especially those outside the state, have criticized Texas’s retention of the
rule of capture for groundwater. 10 Most criticisms of Texas’s retention

doctrines that can be found in other U.S. jurisdictions, such as the “American Rule” of reasonable
use, correlative rights, the Restatement approach, and prior appropriation systems).
9. See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the
Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 252 n.70 (2000) (“Texas, alone among the United States, continues
to follow a rule . . . that permits overlying owners to pump to their hearts’ content.”). For an
example of the practical effects of this rule, see Nicole C. Brambila, Wells Run Dry During Irrigation
Season North of Lubbock, LUBBOCK AVALANCHE-JOURNAL, April 26, 2014 (describing well water
shortages affecting dozens of rural residents, and citing local officials who note “[t]he ag[ricultural]
producers are not breaking any rules. It’s just that their wells are deeper and the water will go to the
deeper well.”). There are partial exceptions to this baseline “rule of the deepest well” or “rule of the
biggest pump,” the most important of which involves landowners in areas governed by local or
regional water regulators, like the Edwards Aquifer Authority or groundwater conservation districts
(“GCDs”), which will be discussed extensively in Parts II–IV, infra. Far less important, because they
are rarely invoked, are exceptions for malice, waste, and subsidence, which will not be discussed at
greater length in this article for reasons of space. For further discussion of these additional
exceptions, see, for example, ADLER ET AL., supra note 6, at 181–82, and Russell S. Johnson,
Groundwater Law and Regulation, in ESSENTIALS OF TEXAS WATER RESOURCES, 4-5 – 4-7 (Mary K.
Sahs ed., 2014).
10. A full list of the many criticisms of Texas’s continued adherence to the rule of capture
would fill many pages. For representative recent examples, see Craig Anthony Arnold, Adaptive
Water Law, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 1043, 1045 (2014) (“In [an] example of maladaptive water law . . . .
[t]he Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the rule of capture governs groundwater rights
in Texas, even though virtually every other state has overruled or abandoned this rule.”); Joseph W.
Dellapenna, The Rise and the Demise of the Absolute Dominion Doctrine for Groundwater, 35 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 291, 327 (2013) (gathering sources and noting that “[c]ommentators
increasingly criticize the rule of capture in Texas”); Robin Kundis Craig, Defining Riparian Rights as
“Property” Through Takings Litigation: Is There Property Right to Environmental Quality?, 42 ENVTL.
L. 115, 117–18 (2012) (“Because [the] rule [of capture] causes fairly obvious problems in terms of
groundwater competition, depletion of aquifers, and effects on connected surface waters, most states
have eliminated it, and the . . . rule is now most relevant in parts of Texas”); Gerald Torres, Liquid
Assets: Groundwater in Texas, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 143, 150 (2012) (“The segregation of
groundwater [and its subjection to the rule of capture gives] . . . owners of the overlying land . . . a
potential monopoly, [thus] seriously imped[ing] the rational development of this resource in the face
of Texas’s heavy dependence on groundwater.”); ROBERT GLENNON, UNQUENCHABLE: AMERICA’S
WATER CRISIS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 129 (2009) (“[C]onsider the state of Texas, which uses
the right of capture to govern (or, more accurately, not govern) groundwater withdrawals.”);
Michael J. Booth & Ross Richard-Crow, Regulatory Dance: Rule of Capture and Chapter 36 District
Perspective, in 100 YEARS OF RULE OF CAPTURE: FROM EAST TO GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT 19,
19–20 (William F. Mullican, III & Suzanne Schwartz eds., 2004) (“Even after 100 years, [the rule of
capture] amazingly is still viable . . . [despite] ridicule from commentators throughout the United
States.”); A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric, 76 N.D. L. Rev. 881,
900 (2000) (noting that “ground water aquifers . . . . were initially allocated by a rule of capture out
of scientific ignorance” that in turn wrought havoc on groundwater supplies, especially in western
states). But see Dylan O. Drummond, Lynn Ray Sherman & Edmond R. McCarthy, Jr., The Rule of
Capture in Texas – Still So Misunderstood After All These Years, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 14 (2005)
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of the rule of capture stem from the same general source. Groundwater
is a natural commons, which has been extensively analyzed in the
commons literature. 11 According to the standard account, under
traditional common-law approaches, each individual groundwater user
will pump as much as she can get out of her well, even when it
foreseeably leads to overdrafts on the aquifer. 12 In fact, this standard
account—of groundwater under the rule of capture as a tragic
commons—has become so well known in the literature that it is
frequently used as an example to illustrate some of the recurring
pathologies of commons dilemmas. 13
At the heart of this generally one-sided debate about the merits of
Texas’s continued retention of the rule of capture lies a fundamental
question that has largely remained unanswered: Given the state’s heavy
reliance on groundwater and its relatively long experience with water
scarcity, why has Texas continued to retain the rule of capture in the
first place? It is true that Texas’s political culture tends to be highly
skeptical of regulatory controls 14 and this skepticism has certainly
contributed to Texas’s approach to groundwater regulation. But many
other states have a political culture characterized by substantial
skepticism towards regulation, and yet they regulate groundwater in less
idiosyncratic ways. So why has Texas groundwater law remained such a
persistent outlier?
No single explanation can provide a complete answer to this
frequently posed question, but this Article contends that something
more specific and idiosyncratic than the state’s general skepticism
towards regulation has contributed to the tragic stability of Texas
groundwater law. In addition to their unusual retention of the rule of
(acknowledging the existence of “many academic jeremiads lamenting the rule of capture,” but
defending the merits of the rule and arguing that it has been consistently applied by Texas courts).
Criticism of Texas water law is particularly widespread among academics, as Drummond et al. point
out, but it is not exclusively the province of academics. Even some courts located in Texas have been
highly critical of Texas groundwater law. See, e.g., Martinez v. Maverick Cnty. Water Control &
Improvement Dist., 219 F.2d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1955) (quoting approvingly an observation made
by the district judge, a former attorney general and governor of Texas, who stated that “the Texas
water laws and decisions are in hopeless confusion”).
11. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 9 (gathering sources).
12. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 106–07 (1990) (noting that “[o]verextraction [is] the logical outcome of the
way groundwater rights were defined” at common law, because “the common law does not provide
secure rights for an overlying landowner”).
13. E.g., Thompson, supra note 9.
14. E.g., Dave Owen, Taking Groundwater, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 253, 260 (2013).
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capture for groundwater, Texas courts—as well as Texas legislators,
politicians, activists, lawyers, academics, legal commentators, and
developers—tend to relate groundwater law to the law of oil and gas to
an unusually frequent degree, and at a level that goes far beyond an
ordinary legal analogy. 15 The widespread identification of groundwater
with oil and gas in Texas is more than a mere quirk or a rhetorical
device: this Article will show that the tragic stability of Texas
groundwater law is due in large part to this “crossover” from oil and gas
law into groundwater law. 16 I call this phenomenon a crossover because
it is both a series of episodic appearances, many of which can and will be
analyzed individually below, as well as a larger role, in which antique
precedents and stylized tropes from oil and gas law, removed from their
usual context, pop up to play a part that has become familiar, if tragic,
in the context of groundwater law.

15. See, e.g., Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 831–32 (Tex. 2012) (“We now
hold that [the law regarding ownership of oil and gas in place] correctly states the common law
regarding the ownership of groundwater in place.”); Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust,
268 S.W.3d 1, 26 (Tex. 2008) (Willett, J., concurring) (citing MICHENER, supra note 2, and
claiming that if water is the lifeblood of Texas, “oil and gas are [the state’s] muscle, which today
fends off atrophy”); Susan Berfield, There Will Be Water, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 11,
2008), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2008-06-11/there-will-be-water
(quoting T. Boone Pickens regarding his groundwater development plans in the Texas panhandle:
“Heck, isn’t it [groundwater] like oil? You have to come back to who owns the water. The
groundwater is owned by the landowner. That’s it.”); The Next Oil: Water – and the Risks to Business,
RURAL URBAN RESOURCES, http://www.ruralurbanresources.org/next_oil_water.htm (last visited
Aug. 6, 2014). Further examples of this tendency will, of course, be examined throughout
the Article.
16. I use the term “crossover” in this Article based on one of the meanings the term holds
regarding various forms of print and televised fiction: namely, to signify situations in which
characters and/or storylines begin in one book, show, or series, and later “cross over” into
another.
See,
e.g.,
Cross
Over,
TV
TROPES,
http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/CrossOver (last visited Aug. 8, 2014) (defining
a crossover as a situation involving thematic similarities across multiple works in which “a popular
character” or “a storyline will begin in one series and cross over into the next one”). Examples of
the device range from characters in Cheers and Frasier, Buffy the Vampire Slayer and Angel, Happy
Days, Laverne and Shirley, and Mork and Mindy, to the appearance of Orpheus, Heracles, and
other Argonauts with their own mythical narratives in the tale of Jason and the Golden Fleece, or
the appearance of figures from the Trojan War or other Greek myths and tragic dramas in the
Aeneid. Crossovers may be identified by future work in other contexts as well, but the law of
groundwater is a natural place to find such a phenomenon, given the substantial blending between
old and new norms, practices, and information that tends to characterize groundwater doctrine
and institutions. See, e.g., Joseph W. Dellapenna, Law and the Provision of Water for Megacities,
2014 INT’L. ENVTL. L. COMM. 6 (suggesting that most systems of water law, due to their social
and highly localized nature, exist in a state of “[i]nstitutional and legal bricolage,” which involves
“an uneven blending of old practices and norms with new practices and norms . . . . and the
reinvention of tradition”).
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In describing this tragic crossover, this Article seeks to do more than
identify deep flaws in Texas groundwater law—it also seeks to illuminate
a previously under-examined potential pathology of the commons. In
the account provided here, instead of working as agents for potentially
useful change, 17 institutions that have developed for one type of
commons (oil and gas) may wind up exercising a tragically stabilizing
influence over institutions developed for and emerging values
developing around another commons (groundwater). More specifically,
prior to very recent judicial and legislative developments and after
decades of tragic stasis, Texas groundwater law showed signs of internal
dynamism, which many observers believed would finally lead to a
transformation away from the overconsumption and waste fostered by
the rule of capture. But this transformation did not occur, due in large
part to the influence of a stylized picture of oil and gas law. Accordingly,
by studying the tragic crossover from Texas oil and gas to groundwater
law, this Article shines a light on a new and previously under-examined
type of commons problem.
Before proceeding, a few caveats are in order. This Article is not
intended as a criticism of contemporary Texas oil and gas law—indeed,
for reasons of space, it does not even purport to provide anything like a
full account of Texas oil and gas law. It is, however, intended to provide
a critical account both of the rule of capture as applied to groundwater
law in Texas generally and of recent trends in Texas groundwater law
more specifically. Embedded in this Article’s analysis is the notion that
unless the tragic crossover from oil and gas law to groundwater law is
clearly identified and broken, future attempts to reform Texas
groundwater law are likely to be frustrated because of the crossover’s
tragically stabilizing influence.
The remainder of the Article will proceed as follows: Part I will
provide a brief general history of groundwater law. Part II will provide a
brief account of the history of Texas groundwater law, its continued
adherence to the rule of capture, the creation and evolution of
groundwater conservation districts (“GCDs”) and their relation to the
rule of capture, and the origins of Texas oil and gas law in early Texas
groundwater cases. Part III will further explore the tragic crossover
from Texas oil and gas law to Texas groundwater law, focusing on how
17. Cf. Brigham Daniels, Emerging Commons and Tragic Institutions, 37 ENVTL. L. 515
(2007) (examining the tragic stability that is sometimes generated by certain commons institutions
even as new values, knowledge, and norms from rival contexts and outside institutions emerge).
Professor Daniels’s work will be discussed at greater length in Part III, infra.
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this crossover acts as a force for tragic stability with regard to Texas
groundwater. Part IV will examine some of the most recent
developments in Texas groundwater law, with particular attention given
to the ways in which the tragic crossover from oil and gas law has
arrested momentum for change within Texas groundwater institutions
in recent years.
I. IGNORANCE AND THE ROOTS OF GROUNDWATER LAW
Today, our understanding of the basic elements of the hydrologic
cycle can be accurately depicted in a single picture designed for young
children. 18 We know that groundwater is not some mysterious and
occult substance, but merely another phase in an ongoing cycle,
connected to the water we see on the surface and falling from the sky
through a number of natural processes. 19 We can monitor and observe
changes in even the most complex groundwater systems with a high
degree of precision and specificity. 20 But it was not always so. For much
of human history, erroneous theories about the origin and nature of
underground water, and its relationship to water on the surface and
precipitation, were at least as prominent as theories that resemble our
current understanding. In short, the courts, lawyers, and parties who
helped develop the common law of groundwater were overwhelmed by
ignorance—often by their own admission—about the nature of the
resource at issue. 21
Due in part to this long-standing confusion about the relationship
between surface water, groundwater, and the larger water cycle, as well
as the relative difficulty in observing groundwater resources compared
to surface water resources, separate doctrines evolved under the
common law for surface water and groundwater. For a number of
reasons, this division in the legal treatment of ground and surface water
18. See, e.g., U.S. Geological Survey, “The Water Cycle for Kids,” available at
http://water.usgs.gov/edu/watercycle-kids.html (“You may think that every drop of rain that
falls from the sky, or each glass of water that you drink, is brand new, but it . . . is a part of The
Water Cycle.”).
19. For a slightly more adult version of the previous diagram, see U.S. Geological Survey,
“The Water Cycle,” available at http://water.usgs.gov/edu/watercycle.html.
20. See, e.g., U.S. Geological Survey, “High Plains Water-Level Monitoring Study,” available
at http://ne.water.usgs.gov/ogw/hpwlms/ (providing summary statistics, informative written
briefs, and a host of animated and full color maps and diagrams regarding changes in use rates, water
levels, and water storage in the Ogallala aquifer).
21. E.g., Joseph W. Dellapenna, A Primer on Groundwater Law, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 265,
267 (2013).
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has been problematic. 22 While this division between the law of surface
water and the law of groundwater may, in many jurisdictions, be
somewhat less pronounced today than in the past, many of its
problematic consequences have proven to be unfortunately persistent. 23
Although the law of groundwater developed separately from the law of
surface water, it did not develop uniformly across all jurisdictions—nor,
indeed, did it develop much at all until the twentieth century. Before
the invention of improved pumping technology in the early twentieth
century, groundwater tended to be a relatively unimportant source of
water in many U.S. jurisdictions: most groundwater was for domestic
use, conflicts over its use occasioned little litigation, and its nature was
so poorly understood that any systematic approach for groundwater
management, whether scientific or legal, was almost inconceivable. 24
On the rare occasions when early- or mid-nineteenth-century
English or U.S. courts were called upon to resolve disputes over
groundwater, the approach they tended to follow was the rule of
capture, 25 frequently treating the issue as one of first impression,
without any relevant precedent from the more extensive law of surface
water. 26 Whether treating the issue as one of absolute first impression or
not, the earliest common law decisions applying the rule of capture
repeatedly emphasized human and especially legal ignorance about the
nature of groundwater as a justification for the rule. 27 The classic and
22. Owen, supra note 14, at 266–67 (noting that fundamental misconceptions about the
nature of groundwater, lasting into and beyond the nineteenth century, prevented American states
“from developing private—or public—law systems for limiting overall consumption or for dividing
aquifers into shares for competing users”).
23. Barton H. Thompson, Beyond Connections: Pursuing Multidimensional Conjunctive
Management, 47 IDAHO L. REV. 273, 294 (2011).
24. E.g., Dellapenna, supra note 21, at 266–67, 270–71.
25. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 6, at 179 (“The doctrine of capture is the oldest
groundwater doctrine in the United States, originating from the English rule of capture established
in Acton v. Blundell.”).
26. See, e.g., Acton v. Blundell, (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. Ch.) 1234 (noting, in a
dispute over groundwater between a cotton mill and a coal mine, that “[n]o case has been cited on
either side bearing directly on the subject in dispute” because “no direct authority can be cited from
our books”); Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533, 541–43 (1850) (citing Acton v. Blundell and even
earlier U.S. cases, but noting that “[t]he law has not yet extended beyond open running streams,”
from which, in a dispute over groundwater, no “light [can] be obtained”).
27. See, e.g., Acton, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1233–34 (“But in the case of a well . . . the water which
feeds it from a neighbouring soil does not flow openly . . . but through the hidden veins of the
earth . . . no man can tell what changes these underground sources have undergone in the progress
of time . . . . [N]or, for the same reason, can any trace of a positive law be inferred . . . whilst the very
existence of the underground springs . . . may be unknown . . . .”); Roath, 20 Conn. at 542 (“Again,
no proprietor knows what portion of water is taken from beneath his own soil . . . [o]n the contrary,
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oft-cited formulation of both this fundamental ignorance, and its
justification for the rule of capture, is seen in a mid-nineteenth-century
Ohio case, Frazier v. Brown:
Because the existence, origin, movement and course of
[underground] waters, and the causes which govern and direct
their movements, are so secret, occult and concealed . . . an attempt
to administer any set of legal rules in respect to them would be
involved in hopeless uncertainty, and would be, therefore,
practically impossible. 28

While ignorance about the nature of groundwater remained
relatively deep and widespread through the late nineteenth century, this
approach to groundwater law continued to hold sway in most U.S.
jurisdictions. 29 However, knowledge about hydrology rapidly began to
improve in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and as it
did, both the traditional justification for the rule of capture and its
popularity began to decline. 30 Although Texas continues to apply the
rule of capture, it is an extreme outlier: the overwhelming majority of
U.S. jurisdictions have abandoned the rule, and, as noted above, Texas’s
retention of the doctrine tends to be criticized by most commentators.
For over a century in Texas, courts resolving groundwater disputes
have dipped into the well of oil and gas law, a process which imposed an
unusual stability on the development of Texas groundwater law that will
be explored further below. In recent years, even as many observers
believed that the institutions governing Texas groundwater were near
substantial change, repeat appearances of this tragic crossover helped
until the well is sunk, and the water collected . . . there cannot properly be said . . . to be any flow of
water at all.”).
28. 12 Ohio St. 294, 311 (1861) (emphasis added). As will be seen below, the “secret,
occult[,] and concealed” language from Frazier v. Brown has had a long life in Texas
groundwater law.
29. See, e.g., A.W. Walker, Jr., Theories of Ownership and Control of Oil and Gas Compared
with Those of Ground Water, WATER L. CONF. PROC. 121 (University of Texas 1956) (noting the
difficulty in formulating any other approach to groundwater beyond the rule of capture in early cases,
given the dearth of scientific knowledge about groundwater in the late nineteenth and very early
twentieth century).
30. See, e.g., ADLER ET AL., supra note 6, at 179 (observing that “modern understanding of
groundwater hydrology has lessened [the rule of capture’s] popularity,” and noting that it only
survives in a few jurisdictions, most notably Texas); see also Dellapenna, supra note 21, at 272–73
(tracking rapid changes in the understanding of groundwater around the turn of the twentieth
century, and noting that the traditional legal rules for groundwater “received considerable
revision . . . by the early twentieth century because hydrologists and engineers, and eventually lawyers
and jurists, learned more”).
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arrest the trend toward increased regulation, ultimately resolving the
open question of rights in uncaptured groundwater by borrowing
heavily from oil and gas law. 31 As traditionally applied to groundwater,
the rule of capture combined two ideas: first, the idea that groundwater
is reduced to individual ownership once pumped out of the ground and
physically controlled, or captured, on the surface; and second, the
related idea that the new owner could not be held liable to neighbors
for injury resulting from this withdrawal. 32 But what about groundwater
under the ground, before the surface owner pumps and captures it?
Under the rule of capture, who (if anyone) holds rights in that resource,
and how strongly are they held?
The answers to such superficially straightforward questions have
been tremendously difficult for courts to provide, not least because
the rule of capture was, in most jurisdictions, abandoned as
knowledge about groundwater improved within a few short decades
of cases like Frazier. 33 Moreover, in Texas, the leading jurisdiction
where the rule of capture for groundwater was retained, courts
steadfastly refrained from addressing questions about potentially
competing public and individual rights in groundwater in place. It is
easy to sympathize with the historical reluctance of most courts to
address questions about potential ownership in place of groundwater
in capture jurisdictions: the early doctrine of capture was based on
multiple and conflicting justifications with very different implications
for potential groundwater ownership rights. 34
Thus, despite some claims to the contrary, the early roots of the rule
of capture as applied to groundwater provide only muddled answers, at
best, to questions regarding potential ownership of groundwater in
place. At bottom, the rule of capture was traditionally and
fundamentally understood as a rule of non-liability between neighbors,

31. See infra Parts III, IV.
32. E.g., ADLER ET AL., supra note 6, at 179.
33. See, e.g., Meeker v. City of E. Orange, 74 A. 379, 384 (N.J. 1909) (noting that the
rule of capture was traditionally justified based on “the mere difficulty of proving the facts
respecting water that is concealed from view,” observing that increasingly “this difficulty is often
readily solved,” and concluding that when the difficulty is solved the justification for the rule of
capture “at once vanishes”).
34. See, e.g., Dellapenna, supra note 21, at 271–74 (noting two “altogether different
rationale[s]” in the early groundwater capture cases, one based on a pure rule of capture, suggesting
no or only weak ownership rights of groundwater in place, and another based on the doctrine of ad
caelum et ad infernos, according to which any groundwater beneath the surface estate simply
belonged to the land in which it was found).
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and this rule of non-liability does not necessarily entail any ownership
rights in the groundwater in place before capture 35—as even advocates
of strong individual property rights in groundwater in place recognize. 36
If anything, the conceptual structure and very name for the rule of
capture itself would seem to suggest that there are no, or at least no
strong, individual ownership rights in groundwater in place. 37 Yet Texas
courts have recently reached the opposite conclusion. The story of how
this happened will be briefly described in Part II below, and an account
of why this happened—including the role of the tragic crossover from oil
and gas to groundwater law—will be discussed in Part III.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF GROUNDWATER LAW IN TEXAS
The Texas Supreme Court adopted the rule of capture in 1904 in
Houston & Texas Central Railroad Co. v. East. 38 After considering the
reasonable use alternative to the rule of capture emerging in other U.S.
jurisdictions, the court in East expressly adopted the rationale set forth
in Frazier v. Brown and similar cases, including the formulaic language
regarding the practical impossibility of applying any alternative rule
given the “secret, occult, and concealed” nature of underground
waters. 39 Indeed, East’s adoption of the reasoning set forth in Frazier

35. E.g., ADLER ET AL, supra note 6, at 179 (noting that “[i]n essence, the doctrine of
capture is a doctrine of non-liability,” and pointing out the importance of “understand[ing] that
ownership of water once ‘captured’ form groundwater is different from owning the groundwater
itself, just like owning a fish caught from a stream is different from owning the fish in the stream”).
36. See Drummond et al., supra note 10, at 60 (arguing that oil and gas law provides much
needed insight to groundwater law, and tracing the “separate and distinct” regimes of capture and
ownership in place through Texas case law); Johnson, supra note 9, at 4–9 (citing a 2008 Texas
appellate court decision and noting the distinction between ownership in place and the rule of
capture, the latter of which “is a tort rule denying a landowner any judicial remedy and was
developed as a doctrine of nonliability for damage, not a rule of property”).
37. Indeed, the very nature of the terms for the “rule of capture,” and the fugitive nature of
the resource, would seem to indicate that the surface landowner who captures and uses the
groundwater beneath her land has no property in the groundwater until the water is captured after
being pumped to the surface. See, e.g., Dellapenna, supra note 21, at 269–70, 273. (“The rule of
capture . . . [seems to] indicate[] by its terms that the water user has no property in the groundwater
until the water is pumped from a well, which might lead one to expect that courts that use this phrase
would have the easiest time moving from the rule of capture to one of the other approaches to
groundwater law. Curiously, this does not seem to be the case in Texas, where the courts most often
use the phrase ‘rule of capture.’”). Explaining the reasons for this “curious” fact about Texas
groundwater is, of course, one of the central aims of this Article.
38. 81 S.W. 279, 280–81 (Tex. 1904).
39. Id. at 281 (quoting the “secret, occult, and concealed” passage from Frazier v. Brown, 12
Ohio St. 294, 310 (1861)).
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and similar cases was so complete that the Texas Supreme Court opined
that it would be “useless” to attempt to add or improve upon them. 40
Over a century later, East and its invocation of the “secret, occult,
and concealed” nature of groundwater remain an oft-invoked
touchstone of Texas groundwater law. Texas courts have repeatedly
rejected alternatives to the rule of capture and cited East’s justification
from ignorance even as knowledge about groundwater has dramatically
improved and alternative rules have gained sway in almost every other
U.S. jurisdiction. 41 But while East affirmed the core principles of nonliability for withdrawal and ownership of groundwater once reduced to
physical possession at the surface, it did not directly decide whether
private ownership rights existed in uncaptured groundwater lying
beneath a surface owner’s land. Moreover, although this question was
sporadically raised in litigation, it was repeatedly ducked by Texas courts
facing groundwater disputes for over a century. East also did not set
forth what rights or duties, if any, the public or state might have in or
regarding such uncaptured groundwater, although it acknowledged the
possibility that such public or state rights might exist and might be
elaborated by the legislature. Texas courts remained similarly allergic to
resolving this issue in the years following East as well, although Texas
voters and the Texas legislature were not so shy.
In 1917, barely a decade after East and following multiple
sustained droughts, Texas voters added the “Conservation
Amendment” to the state constitution. 42 The Conservation
Amendment provides that the preservation and conservation of
natural resources within the state are public rights and duties, and it
authorizes the Texas legislature to pass whatever laws may be
appropriate thereto. 43 Exactly how this ought to be done was left to
the future; this section will discuss how the legislature and courts

40. Id. at 280.
41. E.g., Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 823–24 (Tex. 2012); Friendswood
Dev. Co. v. Smith-Sw Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 25–27 (Tex. 1978); City of Corpus Christi v.
City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798, 802–03 (Tex. 1955).
42. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59. Passage of the Conservation Amendment led to the creation,
during subsequent years of the twentieth century, of a number of political subdivisions in Texas to
control a wide range of natural resources, including both surface water and groundwater. For further
discussion about the Conservation Amendment and the wide range of political subdivisions that have
emerged pursuant to it, see, for example, Martin C. Rochelle, Brad B. Castleberry, and Cristina
Ramage, Meeting Water Supply Needs: Planning, Permitting, and Implementation, at 2-2, in Sahs,
supra note 9 and see generally Angela Stepherson, Water Districts, at ch. 7, in Sahs, supra note 9.
43. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59.
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worked out this mandate, as well as the tensions created between the
Conservation Amendment’s mandate and the rule of capture. For
example, decades later, the mandate set forth by the Conservation
Amendment would provide the authority and impetus for
groundwater conservation districts (“GCDs”), as discussed below.
But the development of this mandate, like the resolution of the
potential private rights in subterranean groundwater left ambiguous
after East, would only begin to be addressed in detail by Texas courts
after many years.
A. The Roots of Texas Oil and Gas Law in East
Indeed, East’s most dramatic impact, at least in the short
term, was not on the slow-developing field of groundwater law at
all, but rather on the rapidly developing field of oil and gas law. In
the early twentieth century, as substantial oil and gas discoveries
were made in the state, Texas courts applied the rule of capture to
subterranean oil and gas, derived in no small part from
groundwater precedent set in East. 44 The first and most obviously
relevant aspect of this original crossover is its extent: Texas
groundwater law had substantial influence over the adoption of
the rule of capture in these early oil and gas cases. 45 Indeed, some
commentators have claimed that early oil and gas law in Texas
could be described as an offshoot of groundwater law, albeit one
which rapidly overtook its parent given the incredibly rapid
development of the oil and gas industry. 46 Moreover, the
substantial influence of early groundwater precedent on the
44. See, e.g., Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 83 S.W.2d 935, 940 (Tex. 1935). (“The rule
in Texas recognizes the ownership of oil and gas in place . . . [and o]wing to the peculiar
characteristics of oil and gas, the foregoing rule of ownership of oil and gas should be considered in
connection with the law of capture,” as elaborated by East and elsewhere).
45. Joe R. Greenhill & Thomas Gibbs Gee, Ownership of Groundwater in Texas: The East
Case Reconsidered, 33 TEX. L. REV. 620, 621 (1955) (“Beyond doubt the [East] decision
influenced the formative stages of the Texas law of oil and gas as the courts developed the
ownership-in-place rationale.”).
46. Drummond et al., supra note 10, at 59 (2004) (“In this sense, oil and gas law is an
offshoot of groundwater law, but oil and gas law developed more quickly because of the rapidity with
which an oil and gas market emerged.”); see also Robert A. McCleskey, Comment, Maybe Oil and
Water Should Mix-At Least in Texas Law: An Analysis of Current Problems with Texas Ground Water
Law and How Established Gas and Oil Law Could Provide Appropriate Solutions, 1 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 207, 213–14 (1994) (claiming that “East influenced early oil and gas law as well as water law,”
and noting that the oil and gas industry, and related legal doctrines, grew extremely quickly in the
early 1900s after major oil discoveries in Texas).
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development of early oil and gas law has been a matter of more
than academic interest: Texas courts have repeatedly noted the
influence of groundwater law on oil and gas law as well. 47
The second aspect of the origins of Texas oil and gas law relevant to
this Article concerns the combination of the rule of capture in oil and
gas law with a rule of ownership of oil and gas in place. 48 Unlike the
early Texas groundwater cases, which left individual ownership rights in
subterranean groundwater as an open issue, the early Texas oil and gas
cases combined the non-liability component of the rule of capture with
a rule of ownership in place. 49 Somewhat ironically, the justification for
recognizing this rule of ownership in place was the improved state of
scientific knowledge of subterranean oil and gas relative to groundwater
at the time of cases like East.
More specifically, by the time Texas courts began applying the rule
of capture to oil and gas, they recognized that improvements in
geology made it possible to approximate both the amount of
subterranean oil and gas and the amount recoverable by various nearby
surface owners in cases involving disputes between surface owners over
blowouts or other forms of wasteful retrieval. Thus, these courts
modified the rule of capture from its application to groundwater in
order to suit these advances in knowledge as well as the fundamental
differences between the resources. 50 A similar process, albeit one that
47. See, e.g., Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Sw. Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 26 (Tex.
1978) (noting that Brown, 83 S.W.2d, one of the “basic cases recognizing private ownership of oil
and gas in place,” relied upon East and its elaboration of the rule of capture to derive this rule of
ownership); see also Coastal Oil & Gas Co. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2008)
(quoting 1 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS §
1.1(A) (2d ed. 1998), “The Rule of Capture may be the most important single doctrine of oil and
gas law.”).
48. See supra note 47; see also Texaco Inc. v. R.R. Comm’n, 583 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex.
1979) (citing Brown, 83 S.W.2d and Corzelius v. Harrell, 186 S.W.2d 1961 (Tex. 1945), and
reiterating “that the rule in this state recognizes the ownership of oil and gas in place . . . . [and] that
such rule should be considered in connection with the law of capture, which is recognized as a
property right”).
49. See, e.g., Elliff v. Texon, 210 S.W.2d 558, 561 (Tex. 1948) (citing Brown, 83 S.W.2d
at 940) (rejecting alternative rules from other jurisdictions regarding ownership in place, and
noting that “[i]n Texas . . . a different rule exists as to ownership. In our state the landowner is
regarded as having absolute title in severalty to the oil and gas in place beneath his land . . . . The
only qualification . . . is that it must be considered in connection with the law of capture and . . .
police regulations.”).
50. See, e.g., Brown, 83 S.W. 2d at 940 (justifying individual ownership rights of oil and gas in
place because “[i]t is now, however, recognized that when an oil field has been fairly tested . . . experts
can determine approximately the amount of oil and gas in place . . . and can also equitably determine the
amount of oil and gas recoverable by the owner of each tract of land”);
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resulted in a different set of rules for a different resource, occurred in
many U.S. jurisdictions with respect to the law of groundwater. Texas
aside, courts in most other U.S. jurisdictions in the mid-twentiethcentury tended to incorporate advances in hydrology and replace the
traditional common law approach expressly rooted in ignorance about
groundwater and the water cycle, in favor of reasonable use
approaches tolerant of more individual control. 51
In part, this is what makes the most recent examples of the
crossover from oil and gas law to groundwater law particularly tragic:
the crossover from oil and gas to groundwater law in Texas is not
based on Texas oil and gas law of today, nor even Texas oil and gas law
of the mid- to late-twentieth century, but rather on archaic principles
and outdated reasoning, both of which are ripped out of context. 52 In
other words, this crossover is a fossil. And when it is invoked it pushes
the institutions that govern Texas groundwater to reiterate the same
punishing inquiry into the relationship of capture and ownership that
Texas oil and gas institutions evolved past many decades ago, 53 while
precluding the consideration of the specific characteristics of the
underlying resource which aided the evolution of oil and gas law.
Section II.B provides a more detailed account of Texas’s retention of
the rule of capture for groundwater throughout the twentieth century,
the increasingly outlier status of Texas’s groundwater law more
generally, and the central role played by the tragic crossover in
this story.

Elliff, 210 S.W.2d at 561 (same).
51. See, e.g., Robert E. Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and Its Implications as Applied to Oil
and Gas, 13 TEX. L. REV. 391, 408 (1935) (“In view of the set course which the oil cases followed
after the courts got their bearing from the water cases, it is rather curious that in many jurisdictions
the courts themselves without any legislative prodding or assistance, changed the common law rule
with respect to the right of unlimited production of percolating waters.”).
52. See, e.g., Susana Elena Conseco, Landowners’ Rights in Texas Groundwater: How and Why
Texas Courts Should Determine Landowners Do Not Own Groundwater in Place, 60 BAYLOR L. REV.
491, 514–515, 517 (2008) (pointing out that recent advocates for the combination of ownership in
place and the rule of capture for groundwater base their arguments on “ancient” doctrinal
approaches that “ignore[] oil-and-gas law’s progress”). For a discussion of Texas oil and gas law’s
sometimes halting progress away from its historic tragic tendencies, see Weaver, infra note 155 and
accompanying text.
53. See Conseco, supra note 52, at 514 (noting that the institutions that govern oil and gas
law in Texas “eventually clarified oil-and-gas law property concepts [relatively] early in oil and gas
law’s evolution, whereas groundwater law is only beginning to face the dilemma”).
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B. The Rule of Capture for Groundwater in Texas

In the first half of the twentieth century, while most jurisdictions
were moving toward more extensive regulation of groundwater, Texas
saw very little groundwater litigation or legislation. 54 Just over half a
century after East, and a couple of decades after affirming the rule of
capture for oil and gas, 55 the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed East
and the rule of capture for groundwater. 56 Of course, this reiteration
of the rule of capture in City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton
occurred as other jurisdictions were moving away from the rule as
applied to groundwater, citing improvements in hydrology and
geology that rendered the main justification for the rule obsolete. 57
The Corpus Christi majority’s decision to reiterate the rule of
capture may have been tragic, but it was at least well-informed, for it
was written over an incisive dissent that expressly pointed out the
outdated nature of the rationale set forth in East, Acton, and Frazier,
discussed the hydrological cycle, and noted Texas courts’ increasing
isolation on the rule of capture generally. 58 Although Corpus Christi
represented a strong reiteration of the rule of capture for groundwater,
the court did not rule on the issue of ownership of groundwater in
place. In fact, Corpus Christi recognized a limitation on the surface
owner’s rights in groundwater once captured, holding that the surface
owner’s ultimate rights in the captured water were qualified by a broad
beneficial purpose limitation—in other words, recognizing that wasteful
retrieval or use provided an exception to the rights secured under the
54. Curious readers who wish to review periods passed over lightly for reasons of space in this
Article may wish to consult a useful timeline of Texas water law, available at Texas Water Timeline,
LEGIS. REFERENCE LIBR. OF TEXAS, http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/legis/watertimeline.cfm (last visited
Mar. 3, 2015).
55. See supra notes 42–49 and accompanying text.
56. City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798, 802–03 (Tex. 1955).
57. Harry Grant Potter, III, History and Evolution of the Rule of Capture, in 100 YEARS OF
RULE OF CAPTURE: FROM EAST TO GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT, supra note 10, at 1, 3 (citation
omitted) (noting that “[h]alf a century after East—at a time when other jurisdictions were
abandoning the [rule of capture] in favor of the ‘reasonable use’ rule—the Texas Supreme Court
reaffirmed the rule of capture in City of Corpus Christi . . . .”).
58. Corpus Christi, 276 S.W.2d at 805 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (“I am convinced that the
rationale of Frazier v. Brown has been rebutted and answered by [developments, including the
Conservation Amendment] and the entire trend of our jurisprudence since that decision and since
the East case. Although this court can close its eyes to the advancement of scientific and legal
knowledge . . . as the majority do here, I do not believe that this court will always do so . . . .”).
Unfortunately, Justice Wilson’s predictive powers were not as keen as his powers of observation
and analysis.
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rule of capture. 59
Although the Texas Supreme Court reiterated the rule of capture
in the middle of the twentieth century, subject to the qualifications
noted above, the great drought of the 1950s prompted further
changes in groundwater law directed by the legislature, including the
creation of the first GCDs. 60 Throughout the state’s history, Texas
water law has been characterized by the state’s frequent droughts, 61
but the drought of the 1950s was uniquely harrowing, so much so
that it remains the benchmark by which future droughts have been
assessed. 62 Even before the drought began to take serious bite,
startling estimates of groundwater depletion and inadequate recharge
in some parts of the state were beginning to be publicized. 63 For
example, in 1949, the Texas Legislature passed the Texas
Underground Water Conservation Act, which authorized the creation
of groundwater conservation districts to exercise the duties set forth
59. See id. at 802 (finding that “under the common-law rule adopted in this state
an owner of land [can] use all of the percolating water he [can] capture from wells on
his land for whatever beneficial purposes he needed it . . . .”) (majority opinion)
(emphasis added).
60. Act of June 2, 1949, 51st Leg., R.S., ch. 306 (codified at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art.
7880-3c), repealed by Act of Apr. 12, 1971, 62d Leg., R.S., ch. 58, § 2. For a brief discussion of
the history and evolution of GCDs, their powers, duties, rights, and statutory authority, see
generally Johnson, supra note 9, Michael Booth, Trey Nesloney, and Deborah Trejo, Chapter 36
Groundwater Conservation Districts and Subsidence Districts, in ESSENTIALS OF TEXAS WATER
RESOURCES, supra note 9.
61. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
62. For background regarding the drought in Texas of the 1950s and a comparison with more
recent droughts, see, for example, Farzad Mashhood, Current Drought Pales in Comparison with 1950s
‘Drought
of
Record,’
AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN,
Aug.
4,
2011,
http://www.statesman.com/news/news/local/current-drought-pales-in-comparison-with-1950s-d1/nRdC5/. For a good, short account of the drought of the 1950s with specific examples and personal
accounts by those who lived through it, see, for example, John Burnett, How One Drought Changed
Texas Agriculture Forever, NPR (July 7, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/07/07/155995881/howone-drought-changed-texas-agriculture-forever.
63. See Timothy L. Brown, A Primer for Understanding Texas Water Law, LEGIS. REFERENCE
LIBR, OF TEXAS 29 (June 2006), available at http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/legis/water_Primer.pdf (“In
1950, it was estimated [at a conference at the University of Texas] that . . . [almost two million]
acre-feet of groundwater was removed from the Ogallala Reservoir when only 50,000 acre-feet of
natural recharge occurred.”). Of course the Ogallala, the largest aquifer in America, is itself a
frequent subject of extended study, with an importance that stretches far beyond Texas alone or the
other High Plains states whose way of life it supports. See, e.g., MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT:
THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 436–37 (1993) (“The irrigation of the
Ogallala region, which has occurred almost entirely since the Second World War . . . [is] one of the
most profound changes visited by man on North America; only urbanization, deforestation, and the
damming of rivers surpass it.”). For obvious reasons of space, only the problems and challenges
related to the mining of the Ogallala in Texas will be discussed here.
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under the Conservation Amendment. 64 In this Act, the Texas
legislature opted against comprehensive statewide controls for
groundwater production and distribution and in favor of locally
controlled districts with broad and flexible mandates. 65 The first GCD,
the High Plains Underground Water Conservation District, was
created in 1951, located in thirteen counties largely above the Ogallala
Aquifer in the Texas Panhandle. 66 Only a handful of GCDs were
created in the decades after the 1949 legislation, largely in West Texas
and the Panhandle. 67
While Texas groundwater law remained relatively stagnant in the
first half of the twentieth century (with few published opinions, little
legislation, and even less impetus for change until the record drought of
the 1950s), oil and gas law in Texas and elsewhere developed much
more quickly, rapidly outpacing its origins in the law of groundwater. 68
64. See supra note 60.
65. Booth & Richard-Crow, supra note 10, at 20 (“The Act, however, was not a
comprehensive approach to groundwater management but rather optional regulation through locally
controlled districts.”).
66. E.g., Johnson, supra note 9, at 4-13.
67. E.g., Brown, supra note 63, at 29.
68. Indeed, the law of oil and gas in Texas so quickly outstripped its roots in water law that
groundwater was subordinated to oil and gas when water issues impinged upon Texas oil and gas
decisions. For example, oil and gas rights in Texas are considered to be part of the dominant mineral
estate, whereas water rights have been held to be part of the surface estate, and therefore subject to the
dominant/servient estate theory, which implies a wide variety of rights in favor of the mineral estate. See
Sun Oil v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 810–11 (Tex. 1972) (“The oil and gas lessee’s estate is the
dominant estate and the lessee has an implied grant . . . of free use of . . . so much of the premises as is
reasonably necessary . . . . [w]ater . . . has been held to be part of the surface estate.”); ERNEST E. SMITH
& JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, 1 TEXAS LAW OF OIL & GAS § 2.1[B][1], at 2-14–2-15 (2d ed.
LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2011) (noting that it is “well established . . . that the mineral fee is the
dominant estate and that the owner of the mineral estate can enjoin actions by the surface owner or
lessee that interfere with the reasonable use, operation and development of the mineral estate”).
Although Texas also recognizes the accommodation doctrine, which requires mineral rights holders to
accommodate, where reasonable, separately owned surface uses, the accommodation doctrine is subject
to the dominant / servient estate theory, which limits its application. See SMITH & WEAVER, supra, at 220–2-22 (noting that “[i]f no established industry practices permit accommodation” of a surface use, or
even if established industry practices exist for accommodation, but would be unreasonably expensive
compared to the value of the mineral estate, “then the surface use must give way”). Sun Oil provides a
useful practical example of the combination of accommodation and the dominant/servient estate theory
as applied to groundwater. In Sun Oil, the Texas Supreme Court held that an oil and gas lease holder
could withdraw hundreds of thousands of gallons from the Ogallala aquifer for a “waterflood”—a waterintensive secondary recovery operation—even though it would shorten the life of the surface owner’s
water supply by several years. 483 S.W.2d at 811–12. For a counter-example from another jurisdiction,
in which a surface owner on similar facts might possess a right of recovery against a mineral rights
holder, see, for example, Wiser Oil Co. v. Conley, 346 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Ky. 1960) (noting that where a
method of “withdrawing oil is employed . . . which will destroy or substantially damage the landowner’s
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By the time Corpus Christi was decided in the mid-1950s, it was “well
settled” in most U.S. jurisdictions that individual surface landowners
had legally cognizable ownership rights in subterranean oil and gas in
place, although the nature of the individual rights differed across
jurisdictions. 69 In some states, the ownership interest was relatively
weak, though still subject to some forms of protection. 70 In Texas,
individual ownership rights in subterranean oil and gas in place were
relatively more robust, and while commentators recognized that such
strong individual rights in a subterranean resource in place represented a
departure from oil and gas law’s roots in the early law of groundwater,
they also recognized that the departure was justified based on the many
differences between the resources in question. 71 This decades-long
process, in which oil and gas law moved beyond its roots in archaic
groundwater cases like East, and towards the recognition of various
forms of individual rights in subterranean oil and gas in place, was a
long and difficult one. 72 Moreover, unlike recent Texas cases and
remaining estates, principles of justice and humanity would require that reasonable compensation be
paid the landowner for the devastation wrought”). Space does not afford a more sustained comparison
of Texas oil and gas law with the law of other jurisdictions. Of course, the historic dominance of Texas
oil and gas law over Texas groundwater law, especially when conflicts between use of the two are
resolved by Texas institutions, is not the same thing as the tragic crossover discussed in this article; but
equally obviously, this historic dominance has probably tended to strengthen the dependence of Texas
courts on the tragic crossover. I thank Bret Wells for pointing out this convergence, and for helpful
discussions about same.
69. Walker, supra note 29, at 130; see also Conseco, supra note 52, at 514–19
(discussing the development of different individual rights in oil and gas in place across
jurisdictions, and comparing the evolution of those rights with then-contemporary
groundwater cases).
70. See Walker, supra note 29, at 131 (noting that states other than Texas, because of the
fugitive “nature of oil and gas and its migration across private property lines during the depletion of a
reservoir, do not consider a landowner as having title to the oil and gas beneath his land, although
they do recognize that he has a property interest in the oil and gas while still in place which is subject
to legal protection.”).
71. See id. at 130–31 (“Some states, such as Texas, have taken the view that oil and gas, like
solid minerals, comprise a part of the land, and that the landowner has title to them while they are
beneath his land. There is, perhaps, more justification for this view in the case of oil and gas than
there is with respect to ground water . . . .”). For example, groundwater, “as part of the hydrologic
cycle,” tends to move much more freely beneath surface private property boundaries than
subterranean oil and gas, at least until human development changes the structure and pressure of the
formations in which oil and gas are found. Id.
72. See, e.g., D. Edward Greer, The Ownership of Petroleum Oil and Natural Gas in Place, 1
TEX. L. REV. 162, 162 (1923) (“It has always been the boast of common-law lawyers that the system
was so flexible and adaptable . . . that it afforded an adequate remedy in any case or state of facts . . . .
[but t]his claim has been put to a severe test in determining the rights of the owner of land to
petroleum oil and natural gas underlying the same.”); Conseco, supra note 52, at 515 (“Courts
struggled with the common law’s recognition of property rights when they could offer no remedy to
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legislation regarding individual ownership rights in groundwater in
place, the process of identifying ownership rights in subterranean oil and
gas in place was characterized by legal institutions’ reliance on
developments in the scientific knowledge of hydrocarbons, as well as
distinctions between different types of subterranean resources. 73
After the great drought of the 1950s, and aside from the
continued slow growth of the first GCDs, Texas groundwater law
remained relatively stagnant in the second half of the twentieth
century, with the state’s continued adherence to the rule of capture for
groundwater marking it out as an increasingly lonely outlier. Unlike
the institutions that governed Texas oil and gas law, and contrary to
the predictions of Justice Wilson’s dissent in Corpus Christi, 74 Texas
groundwater institutions continued to ignore developments in
scientific knowledge about groundwater and legal reasoning about
groundwater from other jurisdictions that postdated East. Texas
groundwater institutions also continued to duck the difficult questions
about the potential existence of individual ownership rights with
respect to groundwater in place, and whether such rights could coexist with the rule of capture, which had been addressed in the context
of oil and gas decades before in Texas and elsewhere. 75
In particular, Texas courts in the second half of the twentieth
century tended to use what one commentator has called “magic words”
to discuss property rights in groundwater disputes, without directly
addressing or deciding such issues, and while retaining the rule of

a landowner whose rights were harmed.”).
73. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text; see also A.W. Walker, Jr., Fee Simple
Ownership of Oil and Gas in Texas, 6 TEX. L. REV. 125, 125 (1928) (“Experience, and a better
understanding of the nature of oil and gas and the economical and physical conditions surrounding
its production, soon revealed that . . . oil and gas was a species of property peculiar unto itself, and
that rules of law that worked very well when applied to other types of property were wholly
inadequate and unjust . . . when applied to oil and gas.”). Ironically, given the existence and nature
of the tragic crossover examined in this article, in which the institutions that govern Texas
groundwater have repeatedly eschewed this kind of analysis, the incorporation of advances in
scientific knowledge and a reliance on the specific characteristics of the resource at hand to shape
departures from old common-law norms was particularly pronounced in Texas oil and gas law in the
first half of the twentieth century. See, e.g., id. (“And nowhere has this process been more marked, or
taken more novel and striking form than in Texas.”).
74. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
75. Indeed, as will be discussed at greater length below, the issue of individual ownership of
groundwater in place would not be resolved by either Texas courts or the Texas legislature until very
recently—the better part of a century after such issues were resolved in the oil and gas context—in
the Day case and its related legislation. See infra notes 190–209 and accompanying text.
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capture with only slight modifications. 76 By examining one example of
these “magic words” at slightly greater length, it is possible to see an
example of the tragically stabilizing crossover from oil and gas law at
work. 77 In Friendswood Development Co. v. Smith-Southwest Industries,
Inc., the Texas Supreme Court considered a lawsuit over ground
subsidence allegedly caused by massive withdrawals of groundwater
around Houston. 78 Friendswood reaffirmed the rule of capture, while
recognizing an exception to the non-liability component of the rule of
capture for surface landowners who cause subsidence to their neighbors
through extreme negligence in withdrawing groundwater. 79 However,
the Friendswood opinion announced that this newly recognized
exception should only apply prospectively, rather than to the defendants
at hand, because “rules of property” were involved in the dispute—
without, of course, ever specifying what those property rules might be,
or how they might relate to or depart from the rule of capture that the
opinion also affirmed. 80
As more than one commentator has pointed out, Friendswood thus
serves as an excellent example of the “confused state” and relative
stasis that characterized Texas groundwater law for much of the
second half of the twentieth century. 81 It also provides an excellent
and representative example of how the tragic crossover from oil and
gas law to groundwater law helped create and perpetuate this
confusion and stasis. If one examines the case just a bit more closely,
one can see how the tragic crossover from oil and gas to groundwater
law simultaneously allowed the Friendswood court to skirt the issue of
potential individual property rights while fostering confusion,
uncertainty, and stasis in groundwater law more generally.
The Friendswood court essentially began its analysis by reaffirming

76. Conseco, supra note 52, at 505.
77. For more detail on the tragically stabilizing effects of the crossover, and for more recent
examples that will be explored in greater detail, see infra Parts III and IV.
78. 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1978). Subsidence in the Houston-Galveston area was such a
substantial problem that the Texas legislature, just a few years prior to the suit, had created a local
regulatory body, the Harris-Galveston Coastal Subsidence District, with powers for new well
permitting, metering, and additional rules broadly similar to GCDs. For a brief discussion of the
history of subsidence in the area, and the powers granted to subsidence districts in Texas, see id. at
23–24. Because GCDs are much more numerous today than subsidence districts, subsidence districts
will not be considered at greater length in this article.
79. Id. at 22, 30–31.
80. Id.
81. Conseco, supra note 52, at 501.
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Texas’s commitment to the common law of groundwater as set forth in
antique cases such as East and Frazier v. Brown. 82 It then noted that
although other jurisdictions had long been moving away from this
approach, the “English rule” had been reaffirmed in Corpus Christi,
which it quoted at approving length. The Friendswood court then
invoked Brown v. Humble Oil, “one of the basic cases recognizing
private ownership of oil and gas in place,” as another example of Texas
courts’ tendency to confirm East and the rule of capture, but it did not
decide whether similar ownership rights for groundwater in place should
be recognized. 83 Instead, the Friendswood court first noted that in the
oil and gas context, Texas courts had declined “to afford protection
against the rule of capture of oil and gas” until the legislature had
acted. 84 Next, the Friendswood court suggested that some sort of
legislative action was similarly appropriate in the groundwater context.
The Friendswood court then acknowledged that the legislature had acted
by creating subsidence districts, which seemed to recognize some sort of
property interests in underground water, but the court failed to consider
at greater length either the nature of these potential property interests,
how these interests might modify the rule of capture, or how the law of
groundwater might perhaps differ from the law of oil and gas at any
greater length. 85
Friendswood thus serves as an excellent representative example, not
only of the confusion and stasis that generally characterized
groundwater law in Texas in the second half of the twentieth century,
but also of the role played by the tragic crossover from oil and gas law in
perpetuating that confusion and stasis. By using precedents like Brown v.
Humble Oil, courts relied on a highly stylized characterization of oil and
gas law to justify Texas’s retention of the rule of capture for
groundwater, despite the state’s increasing isolation as other
jurisdictions adopted approaches to groundwater based on improved
scientific knowledge. More specifically, the rule of capture for
groundwater tended to be justified by allusions to individual property
rights in oil and gas in place, without any sustained analysis of whether
such individual rights might also be appropriate for groundwater, and
without any definitive statement as to whether such rights should
actually apply to groundwater. In addition, opinions like Friendswood
82.
83.
84.
85.

576 S.W.2d at 25.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id. at 27.
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tended to place great emphasis on the legislative and regulatory activity
that helped to tame many of the tragedies that accompanied the
development of Texas oil and gas law, and the absence of similar
legislative or regulatory activity with respect to groundwater—even if, as
in Friendswood, specific legislation relevant to the groundwater issues at
hand had recently passed the legislature! The result, for reasons that will
be explored in Section III.A below, was uncertainty and stasis for much
of the remainder of the twentieth century in Texas groundwater law. 86
Although Texas groundwater law in most of the twentieth
century was relatively static and an increasing target of criticism as its
outlier status became more pronounced, several avenues for potential
change began to emerge in the late 1980s and early 1990s. One
significant focus of debate and potential change was the Edwards
Aquifer. The Edwards is responsible for the historic growth of San
Antonio, as well as the support of unique ecosystems both above and
below the ground, and its significance to the region has placed it at
the center of enduring controversy. 87 Dozens of articles can and have
been written about the litigation and legislation regarding the
Edwards Aquifer, which can only be dealt with in summary fashion
here. 88 In brief, litigation in federal court in the early 1990s
regarding species listed under the Endangered Species Act resulted in
federal court orders requiring the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service to
designate minimum flow amounts for surface springs connected to
the Edwards. 89 Pursuant to the state constitutional Conservation
Amendment, the Texas legislature responded by passing legislation to
86. Contrary to its portrayal in these Texas groundwater cases, the evolution of Texas oil and
gas law was marked by greater reliance on scientific advances and analysis of the specific
characteristics of oil and gas as a resource. See supra notes 50–53, 73 and accompanying text. I make
very few claims here for the utility of Texas oil and gas law or its development as a positive model for
groundwater law or anything else. I simply claim that the characterization of Texas oil and gas law
that can be found in Friendswood, Day, Bragg, and elsewhere has very little to do with how Texas oil
and gas law actually developed, and that this characterization has been tragic for the development, or
lack thereof, of Texas groundwater law. For a more detailed account of the commons tragedies
present in the evolution of Texas oil and gas law, see Weaver, infra note 155.
87. See, e.g., Owen, supra note 14, at 8–9 (noting that the Edwards “might be the nation’s
highest-profile aquifer”). If the Edwards is not the nation’s highest-profile aquifer, that dubious
honor probably belongs to the Ogallala, discussed supra and infra at notes 63 and 172–179 and
accompanying text.
88. E.g., Todd H. Votteler, The Little Fish That Roared: The Endangered Species Act, State
Groundwater Law, and Private Property Rights Collide Over the Texas Edwards Aquifer, 28 ENVTL. L.
845 (1998).
89. Sierra Club v. Lujan, No. MO-91-CA-069 (W.D. Tex., Feb. 1, 1993), appeal dism’d,
Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 995 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1993).
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create the Edwards Aquifer Authority (“EAA”), a new regional
authority with greater staff, resources, and powers than the preexisting GCD, 90 in order to avoid federal management of the Aquifer
under the federal court order. 91
Since its creation, the EAA has been a focus for litigation, 92 some of
which sheds light on the tragic crossover between Texas oil and gas and
groundwater law, and will be discussed in Part IV below. But although
the EAA has been a central figure in the disputes over groundwater that
have helped define groundwater rights in Texas in recent years, with
unique enabling legislation and unusually robust resources, it is only
one among many local entities charged with monitoring and controlling
groundwater against the backdrop of the rule of capture. In addition to
creating the EAA, in the mid-1990s the Texas legislature also
consolidated and revised legislation that had been passed in previous
decades regarding GCDs. 93
This legislation, as well as subsequent legislation in 1997 and 2001,
imposed new planning and management duties on districts, while also
giving them additional powers, including the ability to set production
limits on wells; the ability to limit the water produced based on tract
size or acreage; the ability to impose amendments to increase use
authorized by existing permits; and the ability to impose additional fees
for water captured and exported outside the district boundaries. 94
Following these measures, the number of groundwater districts

90. The pre-existing GCD, the Edwards Underground Water District, had been created in
1959, but it was unable to stem substantial withdrawals that threatened listed species and depleted
supply to some human users. For more detail about the history and regulatory authority of the EAA,
see, for example, Darcy Alan Frownfelter, Edwards Aquifer Authority, in ESSENTIALS OF TEXAS
WATER RESOURCES, supra note 9, at 17-1.
91. Edwards Aquifer Authority Act, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350. The EAAA remains
uncodified, but an unofficial compilation, cited by the Supreme Court of Texas, can be found on the
Authority’s website, EDWARDS AQUIFER AUTHORITY, Legislation and Rules, (2013) available at
http://www.edwardsaquifer.org/legislation-and-rules/the-eaa-act.
92. See Robin Kundis Craig, Does the Endangered Species Act Preempt State Water Law?, 62
U. KAN. L. REV. 851, 875 (2014) (“Existing water users who have either been denied permits or
been issued permits to pump reduced amounts of water from the Edwards Aquifer have sued
continuously to stop implementation of the Act.”).
93. Act of May 25, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 715, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 3755. These
measures were codified into chapter 36 of the Texas Water Code, which is why such GCDs are often
referred to as “Chapter 36” districts. See, e.g., Booth & Richard-Crow, supra note 10. For more
background on this consolidation legislation, see generally Johnson, supra note 9.
94. Id.; see also Act of June 1, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1010; Act of May 27, 2001, 77th
Leg., R.S., ch. 966. For a general discussion of this legislation, see generally Johnson, supra note 9,
at 4-15–4-19; and Booth & Richard-Crow, supra note 10, at 21–22 .
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increased tremendously, more than doubling from just under forty
GCDs in 1995 to over eighty GCDs by 2005. 95 Additional legislation in
the early twenty-first century also added new planning processes and
duties for GCDs and for broader regional groundwater management
areas (“GMAs”), with each GMA encompassing multiple GCDs. 96
Following these reforms, the powers and responsibilities of GCDs
fall into three broad categories. First, GCDs have permitting and
regulatory authority over groundwater wells within a district, including
the ability to set spacing and production limits, subject to certain
exemptions. 97 Second, GCDs may collect relevant data on local water
conditions and uses, which they must then share, upon request, with the
state water development board and the state commission on
environmental quality. 98 Third, GCDs are tasked with helping to
prepare management plans for future water use in the area, in
coordination with the aforementioned state agencies and with GMAs. 99
While the developments of the mid-1990s led to substantial
numbers of new GCDs and the creation of the EAA, it also led to
substantial litigation over the powers of these local and regional
authorities and their interaction with individual claims over
groundwater. Two of these cases are relevant to the tragic crossover
explored in Part III below and will briefly be discussed here. The first of
these cases involved a challenge to the EAA by plaintiffs who claimed
that the enabling legislation interfered with their pre-existing rights to
use groundwater in place in the Edwards Aquifer, beneath land
individually owned by plaintiffs on the surface, amounting to an
unconstitutional taking. 100 In response, the State in Barshop v. Medina
County Underground Water Conservation District argued that
individuals had no vested rights until underground water is brought to
95. LAURA MARBURY & MARY KELLY, UPDATE: SPOTLIGHT ON GROUNDWATER
CONSERVATION DISTRICTS IN TEXAS 1 (2005).
96. For a good general discussion of the “desired future condition” (“DFC”) process, the
interaction between GCDs and GMAs at the DFC planning stage, and the relevant legislation leading
to this process, see generally Johnson, supra note 9, at 4-16 – 4-18.
97. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 36.113–36.116. Exemptions include wells used solely to
supply water for a rig actively engaged in drilling or exploration operations for an oil or gas well
permitted by the Railroad Commission of Texas. Id. § 36.117(b)(2). This exemption will be
discussed at greater length at notes 259–64, infra.
98. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 36.106–36.109, 36.120.
99. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 36.1071–36.1072, 36.108, 36.1082. For further information
about GCDs’ powers and responsibilities, see Booth et al., supra note 60, at 16-16–16-28.
100. Barshop v. Medina Cnty. Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 625–
26 (Tex. 1996).
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the surface and reduced to possession. 101 Barshop, in other words,
presented issues very similar to those seen in Corpus Christi,
Friendswood, and the cases discussed in Part IV below; however, the
Barshop court declined to resolve the issue of individual ownership of
groundwater in place, holding that plaintiffs had failed to show that the
EAA’s enabling legislation would deprive surface landowners of their
alleged ownership rights in all circumstances. 102
The second case from this time period relevant to the tragic
crossover examined in this Article did not involve the Edwards Aquifer.
In fact, it did not involve a GCD at all, but rather a simple and
straightforward attempt to overturn the non-liability portions rule of
capture itself. 103 In Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of America, a
number of surface owners sued a neighboring bottled-water company
for excessive and therefore unreasonable withdrawals of groundwater
that negligently drained their wells. 104 After an extensive account of the
history of the rule of capture in Texas running all the way back to East,
as well as a discussion of the legal and scientific advances that had
occurred in the intervening century, a majority of the court in Sipriano
found that there were “compelling” reasons to abandon the old rule in
favor of increased regulation. 105
However, the Sipriano majority ultimately pulled up short of such a
revision, noting the substantial legislative and regulatory reforms
enacted earlier in the decade, and holding that it was “more prudent” to
wait to see if said legislation and regulation had its desired effect. 106 At
the same time, the Sipriano majority expressly left open the possibility of
further judicial revision of the common law in future decisions, should
the then-recent legislative and regulatory reforms fall short of their
intended effect. 107 In doing so, the majority also noted that the chief
101. See id. at 625 (“The State insists that, until the water is actually reduced to possession, the
right is not vested and no taking occurs. Thus, the State argues that no constitutional taking occurs
under the statute for landowners who have not previously captured water . . . .”). In other words, the
State’s argument in Barshop was based first on recognition of the difference between the rule of capture
as a rule of non-liability and a potential rule of ownership of groundwater in place, and second, on a
claim that only capture as non-liability had previously been recognized by Texas courts.
102. Id. at 631. Although Barshop concluded that the plaintiffs could not make a facial takings
challenge, it left the door open for future as-applied takings challenges to the EAA based on similar
facts. Id.
103. Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999).
104. Id. at 75–76.
105. Id. at 80.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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justification for the rule of capture advanced in East—the “secret and
occult” nature of groundwater and its subterranean movement—no
longer held much water, and that advances in geological and
hydrological knowledge since East generally tended to justify exceptions
to and departures from the rule of capture. 108 These concerns were
amplified by a strongly worded concurrence, which argued that the
main problem with groundwater management in Texas was the rule of
capture, which had been repudiated by every other jurisdiction in the
intervening century. 109
In short, after nearly a century of stasis, marked only by sporadic
legislative and judicial modifications, in the early twenty-first century it
seemed likely to many that Texas soon would cease to recognize the
rule of capture for groundwater. 110 Some argued that the ultimate
departure from the rule of capture would likely come from the courts,
while others suggested that legislative revision of such a long-standing
rule was both appropriate and more likely. While opinions differed
about the appropriate vehicle for change, many observers agreed that
Texas groundwater would soon cease to remain such a relative outlier. 111
Moreover, in light of the increasing skepticism voiced by Texas courts
about both the effects and the fundamental justifications for the rule of
capture, as well as the multiple rounds of legislative activity expanding
108. See id. at 77 (noting that since City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton was decided in
1955, “what was ‘secret [and] occult’ to us in 1904” was no longer so, and that exceptions to the
rule of capture were appropriate as knowledge of groundwater expanded). A comparison of this
language from Sipriano and the language excerpted infra in note 109, with the dramatically different
treatment of Corpus Christi, East, and Frazier v. Brown in, for example, Friendswood, discussed supra
at notes 78–85 and accompanying text, shows why so many observers thought Texas groundwater
was poised for dramatic change in the years prior to Day, and how close Texas groundwater
institutions came to breaking the tragic crossover from oil and gas law examined elsewhere in
this article.
109. Id. at 81–82 (Hecht, J., concurring) (“What really hampers groundwater management
is . . . the common law of capture . . . . When this Court adopted the rule of capture . . . in [East,] we
believed it to have been adopted in England and . . . in every state [but one] . . . . Now there is but
one lone holdout: Texas.”).
110. See, e.g., Potter, supra note 57, at 9 (concluding that “it is unlikely that the Supreme
Court will forever use deference to the Legislature to justify maintaining the rule of capture in the
face of changing circumstances”).
111. See, e.g., Martin Hubert, Senate Bill 1, The First Big and Bold Step Toward Meeting Texas’s
Future Water Needs, 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 53, 68–69 (1999) (noting that outright repeal or
substantial revision of the rule of capture was “[n]oticeably absent from recent legislation,” but
suggesting that such repeal or revision seemed likely after substantial “public education”). Senate Bill
1, referred to in the title of Hubert’s article and discussed supra at note 94 and accompanying text,
was part of the legislative flurry in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century providing new
duties and powers to GCDs.
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the duties and powers of GCDs, some observers concluded that the rule
of capture soon would be replaced with a system of correlative rights or
reasonable
use
more
nearly
resembling
models
from
other jurisdictions. 112
These predictions have largely proved to be incorrect. Contrary to
the academic and judicial predictions discussed above, in the roughly
fifteen years since Sipriano, the Texas Supreme Court has recognized
individual ownership rights over groundwater in place while reiterating
its commitment to the rule of capture as expressed in East and
elsewhere. 113 This story, and the role that the tragic crossover from oil
and gas law has played in causing Texas groundwater law to remain an
outlier despite the apparent momentum towards change in relatively
recent years, will be examined in Parts III and IV below.
III. THE TRAGIC ‘CROSSOVER’: TEXAS OIL AND GAS LAW AND TEXAS
GROUNDWATER LAW
Parts I and II above have traced the common origins of Texas
groundwater and oil and gas doctrine; 114 the relatively more rapid
development of oil and gas law, despite its initial reliance on
groundwater doctrine; 115 the increasing isolation of Texas groundwater
law from groundwater law in other U.S. jurisdictions; 116 the
introduction and evolution of GCDs along with the rule of capture; 117
and finally, Texas courts’ longstanding aversion to deciding whether the
rule of capture for groundwater should be combined with a rule of

112. E.g., Hubert, supra note 111, at 68. For a useful summary of groundwater doctrines in
other jurisdictions such as correlative rights and the “American Rule” of reasonable use, see, for
example ADLER ET AL., supra note 6, at 178–79.
113. See infra notes 199–12 and accompanying text. Of course, many—including the author of
this article—have argued that the rule of capture and a rule of ownership in place will prove difficult
to reconcile with each other. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. As a result, it is possible that
the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Day, which attempts to embrace both the rule of capture and
strong ownership in place rights, either represents or will eventually lead to the functional
abandonment of the rule of capture, at least as it has been traditionally understood, in favor of what
may turn out to be an equally idiosyncratic rule recognizing particularly strong individual ownership
in place rights. No such predictions are offered here, except as follows: for the reasons given in Parts
III and IV below, Texas groundwater law is likely to remain tragically idiosyncratic so long as it
remains subject to the influence of the crossover from oil and gas law discussed in this Article.
114. See supra notes 33–48 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 49–54, 70–74 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 55–60, 75–87 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 61–68 and accompanying text.
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individual ownership in place of the resource, as with oil and gas. 118
While Texas groundwater law remained quite static throughout much of
the twentieth century, in the early twenty-first century many predicted
that the judicial and legislative developments discussed at the end of
Part II signaled a likely end to the rule of capture and the outlier nature
of Texas groundwater law. 119 Ultimately, however, these predictions,
much like the similar predictions voiced in Justice Wilson’s dissent in
Corpus Christi v. Pleasanton, 120 have not been realized.
What explains the tragic stability of Texas groundwater law over so
many decades in the face of substantial outside criticism and Texas
groundwater institutions’ own apparent internal momentum for change
just a few years ago? Parts III and IV of this Article suggest that
recurring appearances of the tragic crossover from oil and gas to
groundwater law, first sketched in Part II, have played a substantial role
in the surprising recent stability of many aspects of Texas groundwater
law. More specifically, as will be shown below, in the last few years, due
in large part to the tragic crossover from oil and gas law to
groundwater, Texas courts and the Texas legislature have at once
reaffirmed the state’s commitment to the rule of capture for
groundwater and recognized substantial individual ownership rights in
groundwater in place, threatening to stall or reverse the practical impact
of the developments discussed above.
There are some—particularly within Texas—who believe that it is
good and useful to incorporate substantial components of oil and gas
law into groundwater law. 121 But it is far easier to think of reasons why
it might be a mistake to rely too heavily on any of the apparent
similarities between hydrocarbons and groundwater: in sum, the
differences between the resources are at once far more numerous and far
more significant. To begin, groundwater on the one hand and oil and
118. See supra notes 57–60, 79–86, 100–02 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 103–13 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 59.
121. See, e.g., Marvin W. Jones & Andrew Little, The Ownership of Groundwater in Texas: A
Contrived Battle for State Control of Groundwater, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 578, 590 (2009) (“No one
would now seriously argue that oil and gas does not belong to the landowner by virtue of his
ownership of the soil itself. Nor can anyone now seriously contend that groundwater should be
treated any differently.”); see also Drummond et al., supra note 10, at 59–61 (discussing the ways in
which “oil and gas law provides much needed insight” to the law of groundwater); Edmond R.
McCarthy, Jr., Mixing Oil and Gas with Texas Water Law, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 883 (2012);
McCleskey, supra note 46; Nathan Weinert, Note, Solutions for Interstate Groundwater Allocation
and the Implications of Day, 44 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 105, 138–142 (2014) (discussing the potential, and
potential pitfalls, of oil and gas law as a “useful framework” for groundwater law in Texas).
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gas on the other are fundamentally very different resources: for example,
unlike most uses of oil and gas, many uses of groundwater lack ready
substitutes; additionally, oil and gas are nonrenewable resources,
whereas groundwater, although it may be locally nonrenewable, is part
of a larger renewable resource cycle. 122
Moreover, groundwater is often used on the surface land tract from
which it is produced, whereas oil and gas, once extracted, are much more
frequently consumed far from their subterranean reservoir.123 Similarly,
until the reservoir is accessed by human industry, subterranean oil and gas
tends to be relatively less mobile, whereas groundwater is much more likely
to be unconfined and to move naturally without human intervention.124 In
addition, water valuation may be particularly tricky, much more so than oil
and gas, for multiple reasons beyond differences in the goods’
substitutability. First of all, the existence of abundant or renewable supplies
of groundwater may have unique cultural significance to a community in
ways that typically are not present with respect to hydrocarbons.125 More
prosaically, when groundwater supplies are locally depleted in arid areas, the
value of the surface land may decrease drastically, far more than when
hydrocarbon reservoirs are depleted, because the surface land becomes
unsuitable for almost any other human use.126 The medium and long-term
financial consequences of such over-exploitation are potentially devastating,
both for individual landowners and for entire communities that depend on
property tax revenues to fund necessary public services.127

122. See, e.g., GLENNON, supra note 10, at 316 (“[T]here is no substitute [for water],
regardless of price . . . . [W]e can shift from coal to oil, or oats to wheat, or hydroelectric power to
power generated by fossil fuels,” but we cannot shift away from water); see also Forrest Wilder, The
Texas Supreme Court Turns Water Into Oil in a Landmark Groundwater Decision, TEX. OBSERVER,
Feb. 25, 2012 (pointing out that it is easy and important to differentiate between water and oil and
gas because “[o]il and gas are finite commodities non-essential to human life,” with “[t]heir
value . . . determined in a global marketplace in terms of dollars per unit,” whereas “[w]ater . . . is
absolutely essential to human life, in all places at all times”).
123. Conseco, supra note 52, at 518–19 (citing Walker, supra note 29, at 130, who pointed
out that “ground water is usable on the land where it is found, whereas oil and gas are not”).
124. Walker, supra note 29, at 131 (noting that “there is [usually] no appreciable movement
of . . . oil and gas across [surface] private property lines until pressure changes in the reservoir have
been caused by development and producing operations,” whereas “ground water, as part of the
hydrologic cycle, is generally in constant movement in a state of nature although the rate of
movement may be very slow in some formations”).
125. PORTER, supra note 3, at 8–14 (discussing the cultural importance of water in San
Antonio from the historic role of acequias to the marketing of Pearl Beer).
126. See CHARLES R. PORTER, SHARING THE COMMON POOL: WATER RIGHTS IN THE
EVERYDAY LIVES OF TEXANS 112–16 (2014).
127. See id. at 113 (noting that for many Texas communities, “the troublesome consequence

1313

03 BRAY.FINAL 1283-1346 (DO NOT DELETE)

10/8/2015 9:51 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2014

In what follows, this Article will occasionally refer to many of the
potential problems identified above that accompany analogies between
groundwater and oil and gas, but it will also leave this well-tilled field
to break new ground, analyzing the ways in which the incorporation of
a highly stylized picture of oil and gas law into Texas groundwater law
has acted as a force for tragic stability, even as Texas groundwater
institutions appeared to be generating momentum for dynamic and
positive change. More specifically, Section III.A immediately below
situates the tragic crossover discussed in this Article in the context of
the larger legal academic literature on tragic commons, focusing on
recent accounts that attempt to explain other tragically stable
commons institutions. Next, Section III.B discusses some of the tragic
tendencies of Texas oil and gas law. Section III.B also introduces some
of the ways in which the tragic tendencies from oil and gas law have
negatively affected Texas groundwater law in recent years, focusing on
the development of GCDs in Texas. Finally, Part IV discusses the
tragic influence of the oil and gas model on the very recent
development of Texas groundwater doctrine in the courts in Edwards
Aquifer Authority v. Day 128 and subsequent related developments.
A. The Structure of Tragically Stable ‘Crossovers’
While the problems caused by Texas’s approach to groundwater are
substantial and likely to substantially increase, they are relatively easy to
spot and predict. As noted above, the commons literature has long
identified the tragic consequences of groundwater regimes characterized
by institutions that fail to limit individual rights to withdraw water, such
as a reliance on the rule of capture. 129 Indeed, the tragic consequences
of capture-based approaches to groundwater are so well known that
such approaches have been used as case studies in other recent work
focusing on the causes of persistently tragic commons institutions. 130
Similarly, using various examples from water law, other recent work has
of water scarcity . . . will be a decrease of land values leading to a weakened ad valorem tax base,”
threatening “the funding of our most cherished public services, like education and health care”).
128. 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012).
129. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 12, at 136 (noting that “[a] pumping race is the first-order
dilemma . . . where legal rights to withdraw water are not limited,” as everyone with a right to access
such a supply “has a dominant strategy to pump as much water as is privately profitable and to ignore
the long-term consequences on water levels and quality”).
130. See generally Thompson, supra note 9 (suggesting that persistently tragic commons are
difficult to resolve because of loss-framing effects, scientific and social uncertainty, and
discounting problems).
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examined the “tragic stability” that is sometimes generated by certain
commons institutions even as new values and knowledge regarding the
relevant resource emerge. 131 The tragic aspects of Texas groundwater
law, therefore, fit easily into a familiar frame—indeed, they have been
sketched before in recent work. 132 These tendencies are problematic
enough when they work within tragically stable commons institutions to
internally reinforce stubbornly persistent commons regimes, as previous
work has observed. However, in the example of Texas groundwater,
these tendencies are particularly acute because of the tragic crossover
from oil and gas law, as detailed below.
To date, much of the work on persistently tragic commons has
focused on one of two types of analysis. Some recent work on
persistent pathologies of the commons has focused on standard sorts
of problems that tend to recur across different types of frequently
tragic commons, such as groundwater or fisheries. 133 Other recent
work has focused on the ways in which tragically stable institutions
resist potentially felicitous changes developed by rival institutions and
for different resources. 134 This Article draws on both strands of the
literature, by focusing on the root causes of the persistently tragic
nature of Texas groundwater law and analyzing this commons regime
in light of both rival institutions and analogous commons contexts. In
the remainder of this Section, I draw upon recent literature on
persistently tragic and tragically stable commons institutions to show
generally how such a tragic crossover can occur.
For example, one factor contributing to persistently tragic commons
identified by previous research is the role that framing certain actions as
gains or losses can play. 135 It is well established that whether an action or
a series of changes is framed as either a gain or a loss tends to make a
substantial difference in how that action or those changes are
perceived—people resist changes that are framed as causing losses, and
they are more receptive to changes that can be characterized as
131. See, e.g., Daniels, supra note 17, at 542–44, 554–59 (2007) (discussing a variety of factors
contributing to tragic stability in the commons context and using the evolution of water law in
western U.S. states as an example).
132. See supra note 109.
133. E.g., Thompson, supra note 9, at 247–54.
134. See generally Daniels, supra note 17 (noting that while much of the previous commons
literature has focused on the importance of building and maintaining stable commons institutions,
many common-pool resource systems are tragically administered because of existing and tragically
stable institutions).
135. Thompson, supra note 9, at 256–58.
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providing gains. 136 In the commons context, however, framing can be
particularly problematic, because reforming persistently tragic commons
institutions frequently involves convincing current resource users to
accept a lower level of access or use than they previously enjoyed, at
least in the short term.
This is difficult to do, even when the tragedy at hand is substantial
and nearly self-evident. Resolving a persistently tragic commons almost
inevitably involves requiring current resource users to accept a lower
level of access or use than they previously enjoyed. 137 Thus, even
rational resource users in a clearly tragic commons situation may resist
certain types of solutions, despite self-evident collective gains, if those
solutions are readily framed as imposing individual losses. Moreover, as
previous work has noted, such framing problems in the commons
context often become particularly acute when a jurisdiction recognizes
individual property rights in common access to a particular resource,
because this tends to strongly reinforce the difficult framing of many
commons solutions. 138 Indeed, the prospect of losing such individual
property rights can be doubly problematic because they can both
reinforce the tragically stabilizing framing effect discussed immediately
above and add to it a sense of entitlement grounded on intuitions about
fairness. 139 Of course, this is exactly what has happened in Texas in the
recent developments related to Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day,
discussed at greater length in Section III.C below.
Like framing effects, various sorts of uncertainty often contribute to
persistently tragic commons by amplifying resource users’ natural
tendency toward self-serving biases. Previous work on the role of
uncertainty in persistently tragic commons dilemmas has divided
uncertainty into the two categories of scientific uncertainty and social

136. See, e.g., Christopher McCusker & Peter J. Carnevale, Framing in Resource Dilemmas:
Loss Aversion and the Moderating Effects of Sanctions, 61 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 190 (1995).
137. This may occur even when there are both individual and collective gains from such a
positive change—individual users may have to exchange some loss of access for greater long-term
viability of the resource.
138. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 9, at 257 (“Governments make the [framing] problem
worse where they recognize property rights in common access to a resource, as many states have
done with groundwater.”).
139. See id. (noting that in addition to exacerbating framing problems, recognized property
rights in a commons “may focus resource users on their individual interests rather than on total
societal well-being” by fostering a sense of entitlement that reinforces “the very dichotomy that
underlies the tragedy of the commons”).

1316

03 BRAY.FINAL 1283-1346 (DO NOT DELETE)

1283

10/8/2015 9:51 PM

Texas Groundwater and Tragically Stable “Crossovers”

uncertainty. 140 Both forms of uncertainty can lead individual resource
users into wishful thinking and self-serving interpretations of fairness. 141
A good example of scientific uncertainty, and the wishful thinking that it
can induce in persistently tragic commons dilemmas, can be seen in the
persistence of the “secret, occult, and concealed” justification for the
rule of capture of groundwater decades after hydrological and
geological knowledge have substantially increased and therefore
discredited that justification. 142
While the effects of scientific uncertainty on the tragic roots of
Texas groundwater law are easy to see, the problematic effects of social
uncertainty, which are heavily influenced by the crossover from oil and
gas law to the groundwater context, are at least as relevant to the recent
tragic stabilization of Texas groundwater law. By social uncertainty, I
refer to uncertainty about the fair or right way to allocate burdens
associated with saving a commons such as groundwater. As with the
recognition of new property rights and the framing effects discussed
above, social uncertainty contributes to persistently tragic commons
regimes by encouraging self-serving biases and egocentric
interpretations of fairness, which may exacerbate tragic commons
dilemmas even when the tragedy, and potential solutions, seem relatively
clear. 143 In the case of Texas groundwater, social uncertainty is
exacerbated by the tragic crossover from oil and gas law, because
reforms to existing groundwater institutions may appear to ask private
groundwater rights holders to give up rights or access retained by
analogous private oil and gas interests.
Beyond framing and uncertainty, the existing literature has
identified problems associated with inter-temporal tradeoffs as another
contributor to persistently tragic commons dilemmas. Here too the
tragic crossover from Texas oil and gas law to groundwater substantially
exacerbates the general problem identified by the existing literature. In
general, in the case of persistently tragic commons, many of the
problems related to inter-temporal tradeoffs relate to the reinforcement
of resource users’ natural optimism bias. 144 In the groundwater context,
for example, prior research has recognized that resource users tend to
minimize the cost of uncertain distant losses, in part based on a vague
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 258–59.
Id.
See supra Part II.A and infra Part III.B.
E.g., Thompson, supra note 9, at 258–61.
Id. at 264–65.
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sense that any such uncertain distant losses related to aquifer depletion
will be at least partially borne by the government. 145 In the context of
Texas groundwater, the optimism bias and these problems of temporal
framing for groundwater users are particularly acute because of the
tragic crossover from oil and gas law to the groundwater context.
Overcoming the optimism bias in tragic groundwater regimes is difficult
enough, but when such problematic groundwater rights and institutions
are repeatedly linked with the boundless optimism underlying Texas oil
and gas law and practice, the task is exponentially more difficult. 146
B. Tragic Tendencies and Tragic Influence
The origins of the U.S. oil and gas industry lie outside Texas, but
beginning in the early twentieth century, immense discoveries of oil
and gas reservoirs within the state placed Texas oil and gas law at the
center of the field. 147 For generations after the state’s recognition of
the rule of capture for oil and gas, Texas’s leading role in both the oil
and gas industry and as a leading jurisdiction for oil and gas law have
been substantial sources of pride, both for the general populace and
for the legislature and courts. 148 The prominence of the oil and gas
145. Id. at 265.
146. The general influence of Texas oil and gas institutions and doctrine are discussed
immediately below in Part III.B. An excellent and succinct example of the optimism endemic to the
Texas oil and gas industry, its governing institutions, and its wider cultural influence can be seen in
the title of a recent law review article, taken from bumper sticker widespread in Texas in the mid1980s: Please Give Us One More Oil Boom – I Promise Not to Screw It Up This Time. See Wells, infra
note 162, at 321–22 n.15.
147. See, e.g., RON CHERNOW, TITAN 431 (1998) (noting that the Texas oil boom, which
began in 1901 at Spindletop, “redrew the industry map,” and that “[b]y 1905 Texas accounted for
more than a quarter of the crude oil being pumped in America”).
148. See, e.g., Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 27–28 (Tex.
2008) (Willett, J., concurring) (noting the “profound[] importan[ce]” of energy production and
energy law to Texas and the state’s leading role nationally in these fields). The Supreme Court of
Texas recognized the state’s leading role in oil and gas as early as 1935. See Brown v. Humble Oil &
Ref. Co., 83 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Tex. 1935) (“The oil industry in this state has become
stupendous. . . . Texas is now the leading state in the production of oil and in oil refineries.”).
Examples of the influence of the energy industry and oil and gas law in Texas beyond the courts are
easy to find, from sports teams, to movies, to license plates, to political imagery. Perhaps the most
succinct statement comes from the Texas State Historical Association: “For Texans, the 20th century
did not begin on January 1, 1901, as it did for everyone else. It began nine days later, on January 10,
when . . . the Lucas No. 1 well blew in at Spindletop near Beaumont.” Mary G. Ramos, Oil and Gas:
A
Cultural
History,
in
TEXAS
ALMANAC
(2001),
available
at
http://www.texasalmanac.com/topics/business/oil-and-texas-cultural-history. For a discussion of
the historic place of Texas oil and gas law, and of the priority given to oil and gas in conflicts with
other resources in Texas courts, see supra note 68.
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industry and of oil and gas law is reflected in the two resources’
treatment relative to other resources and their governing regulations
and doctrine: even when courts and the Texas legislature recognize the
importance of other resources, they tend to give substantive and
rhetorical pride of place to oil and gas. 149 Moreover, the relative
importance of Texas oil and gas law stretches beyond the boundaries
of the state; notwithstanding Texans’ general knack for selfpromotion, 150 in many ways Texas oil and gas law is and has been a
model for many other jurisdictions.
However, while Texas oil and gas law has often been a source of
inspiration within the state and a model for other jurisdictions, it has
not always been a positive model. 151 Space does not permit anything like
a full account of the history of Texas oil and gas law, nor does this
Article attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of the merits and
faults of current oil and gas practice and doctrine. But in order to
connect and fully appreciate the tragic crossover between oil and gas
and groundwater law examined here with relevant recent commons
literature, a few historically tragic aspects of the evolution of Texas’s oil
and gas law must be briefly examined. More specifically, the tragic
potential of Texas oil and gas law for groundwater law can be seen in
the state’s historical approach to unitization and its past and present
approach to flaring, both of which are discussed in greater detail below.
Unlike most states, Texas lacks a compulsory unitization statute,
which allows a state agency to force all owners of oil and gas in a
common field into a unit to avoid waste and increase total recovery. 152
Unitization, however achieved, is almost universally recognized as the
149. For an example of how courts tend to recognize the preeminence of oil and gas law
relative to the law governing other resources, see, for example, Garza, 268 S.W.3d at 27 (Willett, J.,
concurring) (noting that although water may be the “lifeblood of Texas,” the oil and gas industry
and related law “are its muscle, which today fends off atrophy”).
150. See, e.g., Hendrik Hertzberg, Yes, Texas Is Different, T HE N EW Y ORKER . Sept. 26,
2012, available at http://www.newyorker.com/news/hendrik-hertzberg/yes-texas-isdifferent (reviewing various instances of Texas exceptionalism at the opening of a museum of
state history).
151. See, e.g., DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY & POWER,
234–35 (3d ed. 2009) (detailing the “hot oil” smuggling, chaotic production, and pipeline sabotage
in early 1930s Texas oilfields that threatened “the complete collapse of the oil industry as a whole”).
Of course, like Texas oil and gas law, Texas groundwater law has often been a focus for negative
attention as well. See supra note 10.
152. See, e.g., FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 271,
275–76 (3d ed. 2010) (noting that “[m]ost states have compulsory unitization statutes . . . which
allow the conservation agency to force holdouts into a unit that is expected to increase the total
recovery from the field” but that “Texas . . . does not”).
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most efficient means to produce oil and gas. 153 The reasons for this are
relatively straightforward: prior to consolidation through unitization,
individual operators seeking to exploit a larger source of supply available
to others may pursue strategies related to well spacing, drilling, retrieval,
secondary recovery, and technological investment, which are
individually rational but tend to be inefficient or even wasteful when
viewed in terms of the efficient exploitation of the larger reservoir. 154
This means that Texas’s lack of a unitization statute is not merely
unusual: it is an outlier that is at least as striking and significant, in its
own way, as Texas groundwater law’s retention of the rule of capture. 155
And, for much of its history, Texas’s lack of a compulsory unitization
statute has been widely regarded as a negative outlier—again, much like
Texas’s continued adherence to the rule of capture in the groundwater
context—although, unlike the continued criticism of Texas’s continued
adherence to the rule of capture in the context of groundwater, many
believe that the negative consequences from Texas’s idiosyncratic
approach to unitization are much less significant today than in the
past. 156 However, while Texas’s unusual approach to unitization may
have ultimately stabilized without a compulsory statute, 157 prior to this
relatively recent stabilization, the state’s rejection of compulsory
unitization is widely acknowledged to have caused incredible waste—so
much so that it has also become a classic tragic commons account. 158

153. E.g., JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS: A
STUDY OF LEGISLATIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND JUDICIAL POLICIES 2 (1986).
154. E.g., PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, OIL AND GAS: CASES AND MATERIALS
877 (2011).
155. See Jacqueline Lang Weaver, The Tragedy of the Commons from Spindletop to Enron, 24 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 187, 187 (2004) (“When I first started teaching . . . I was stunned
to learn that Texas . . .was the only [state] without a compulsory unitization law,” which is
“universally recognized as necessary to assure the maximum efficient recovery of oil and gas while
also allocating fair shares . . . .”).
156. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 152, at 276 (noting that historically, “[i]ndependent
operators generally received far more than their fair share of a reservoir’s bounty under the peculiar
(and very inefficient) prorationing and drilling permit system used in Texas for decades,” while also
noting that many “of the largest fields in Texas have been unitized because the Railroad Commission
arm-twisted the operators).
157. WEAVER, supra note 153, at 4 (“While the good is second to the best, it is nonetheless a
monumental achievement by a state administrative agency and by the Texas judiciary to have secured
as much unitization as now exists without legislative support . . . .”).
158. See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 155, at 187, 190 (noting that “waste in [Texas’s] oil fields in
the first decades of the twentieth century was staggering” and that “Texas, the state without any
compulsory unitization statute, heads the list of marginal, idle, and orphan [oil and gas] wells”);
BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 152, at 253–55, 270–71, 275–77.
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Beyond unitization, scholars have also identified Texas’s past and
recent treatment of “flaring” as another standard example of a tragic
commons regime within the state’s oil and gas law. Subsurface
petroleum reservoirs are typically comprised of a mixture of liquid and
gaseous hydrocarbons, and even when a reservoir tends to produce
mainly liquid crude oil, the extracted oil is accompanied by some
measure of natural gas called “casinghead gas,” which was originally
dissolved in the pressurized oil underground. 159 When the oil is
extracted through drilling and capture at a well, thereby lowering the
pressure of the oil and gas solution, the gas comes out of solution,
much like carbon dioxide is released when a can of Coca-Cola is
opened. 160 And when casinghead gas is burned off at the wellhead—in
other words, when it is treated as an unwanted byproduct of the
captured oil, despite its potential value—the practice is known as
“flaring.” 161 Of course, the decision to flare by an individual well-driller
may be individually rational, especially when local markets for oil are
substantially more profitable for individual producers than local markets
for natural gas. At the same time, however, flaring has been identified as
yet another classically tragic approach to a commonly held resource: the
practice is environmentally damaging, it literally burns up as byproduct a
potentially valuable resource, and it can degrade reservoir pressure. 162
Despite long-standing and widespread academic criticism of the
practice, at this point, the reader will probably not be surprised to learn
that the practice of flaring has a long and wide history, both in the U.S.
generally and in Texas more specifically. 163 In Texas during the first half
of the twentieth century, long-standing prohibitions against wasting
natural gas did not apply to active oil wells, and repeated attempts in the
state legislature to strengthen the relevant regulatory body’s authority
repeatedly failed. 164 While the collective waste and potential value of the
flared gas were recognized even at the time, individual operators
focused on oil extraction flared immense amounts of casinghead gas, on
159. E.g., BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 152, at 240–41.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 259.
162. See, e.g., Bret Wells, Please Give Us One More Oil Boom – I Promise Not To Screw It Up
This Time: The Broken Promise of Casinghead Gas Flaring in the Eagle Ford Shale, 9 TEX. J. OIL, GAS
& ENERGY L. 319, 328 (2013) (“Flaring represents a classic tragedy of the commons.”).
163. B OSSELMAN ET AL ., supra note 152, at 259 (noting the widespread frequency of
flaring nationwide until the 1950s); Wells, supra note 162, at 325 (“Flaring has a long and
storied history in Texas.”).
164. E.g., Wells, supra note 162, at 326.
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a scale that is virtually impossible to estimate or measure today beyond
anecdote and analogy. 165 This tragic collective misuse of a common-pool
resource occurred despite then-contemporary analysis about
problematic aspects of widespread flaring, the potential value of the
wasted gas, and the role of Texas’s idiosyncratic approach to oil and gas
law in fostering such problems. 166
Over time, much as with Texas’s approach to unitization, the
widespread and patently wasteful flaring of the early twentieth century
was curbed due to incremental reform by the state regulatory agency,
the resolution of decades of litigation by individual well owners related
to piecemeal regulatory reforms, and the development of substantial
infrastructure during and after World War II. 167 But the patchwork of
regulatory and informal fixes applied in the mid-twentieth century to
address widespread flaring have, in recent history, proved insufficient. In
roughly the last half-decade, the exploitation of unconventional shale
formations in west Texas and elsewhere has led to another round of
widespread flaring, based on a pattern strikingly similar to that in the
first half of the twentieth century: individual drillers, choosing to
maximize returns from producing crude oil as quickly as possible, have
chosen to flare and have not been deterred from doing so despite the
depletion of this common-pool resource. 168 As in the past, awareness of
the costs of this recurring tragedy of the commons are not confined to
legal academics: the popular press and industry representatives have

165. Id.; see also Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. Civ. App. 14th
1978), rev’d in part, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981) (noting that “at one time, one could drive . . . at
night through the East Texas Oil Field without turning on the lights of one’s vehicle,” and that
“[f]rom the air, West Texas was said to look as if campfires of all of the armies in the history of the
world were burning below”).
166. For a good example of such then-contemporary analysis, see Robert E. Hardwicke,
Evolution of Casinghead Gas Law, 8 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1929).
167. E.g., DAVID F. PRINDLE, PETROLEUM POLITICS AND THE TEXAS RAILROAD COMMISSION
66–70 (1981); see also Middleton, 571 S.W.2d at 351–54.
168. E.g., Wells, supra note 162, at 328–29. For a useful recent examination of the individual
incentives behind this problem, as well as the individual and collective rewards at work in the Eagle
Ford, see, for example, Melissa Block, Drilling Frenzy Fuels Sudden Growth in Small Texas Town,
NPR SPECIAL SERIES (April 10, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/04/10/295332292/drillingfrenzy-fuels-sudden-growth-in-small-texas-town. For further discussion of hydraulic fracturing, the
technique that has led to much of the growth in the Eagle Ford and elsewhere, see infra notes 254–
64 and accompanying text. The recent phenomenon of widespread flaring related to the exploitation
of oil and gas in unconventional reservoirs is not limited to Texas alone. See, e.g., Brad Quick &
Morgan Brennan, Inside North Dakota’s Latest Fracking Problem, CNBC.COM (Aug. 22, 2014),
available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/101934384 (“In the Bakken, flaring has become
synonymous with drilling.”).
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noted the inefficiency presented by contemporary flaring in
unconventional shale formations as well as the collective environmental
costs brought on by the practice. 169 Yet the flaring continues—it is a
familiar problem with many critics but few solutions in sight. 170
This section has sought to establish two points: first, Texas oil and
gas law has proven to be a remarkably influential model, especially
within the state; and second, despite its positive connotations within the
state, Texas oil and gas law is subject to certain deep-seated, recurrent,
and well-recognized tragic tendencies, all of which resonate particularly
strongly with the tendencies towards problematic framing effects,
uncertainty, and optimism biases in tragically stable commons. Part IV
will explore how additional recent examples of the crossover have
tragically stabilized the development of Texas groundwater law in the
legislature and the courts. But before turning to these most recent
examples of the crossover in Part IV, this section will conclude with one
final example of the tragic crossover that predates Day and its related
legislation—one which shows the deep roots of the tragic crossover
beyond any recent legislation or judicial decision, and the problems that
the crossover can cause in public debates about groundwater in Texas.
As discussed above, the earliest GCDs in Texas were created in the
Panhandle and over the Ogallala Aquifer, during the record Texas
drought of the 1950s. 171 Compared to more recently established GCDs
elsewhere in the state, these Panhandle GCDs are relatively wellestablished, well-funded, and well-known to their communities. 172
169. See, e.g., John Tedesco & Jennifer Hiller, Up in Flames: Flares in Eagle Ford Shale Wasting
Natural Gas, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, August 25, 2014 (quoting industry officials, regulators,
and activists decrying widespread flaring as a “disastrous” waste and “burning up money” with
substantial negative environmental consequences).
170. See, e.g., Anna Driver & Bruce Nichols, Shale Oil Boom Sends Waste Gas Burn-Off Soaring,
REUTERS, July 25, 2011 (quoting energy analysts and environmental critics describing recent flaring
practices in Texas’s Eagle Ford field as “just burning money” and the inevitable byproduct of
“drilling so many wells down there”).
Of course, not every critic of contemporary flaring is so resigned to the inevitability of the problem or
the apparent difficulty of obtaining a solution. For a thorough and detailed set of potential solutions
to flaring in the Eagle Ford, see Wells, supra note 162, at 325–55.
171. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
172. Moreover, the management goals of the Panhandle GCDs tend to sanction withdrawals of
the underlying aquifer far beyond its rate of recharge—in other words, the GCD’s plan is to permit
withdrawals that will ‘mine’ the Ogallala over time. For example, the High Plains Water District seeks
to preserve only 50 percent of the remaining capacity of the Ogallala in its area within 50 years. See,
e.g., Nicole C. Brambila, High Plains Water District Rules To Require Metering, LUBBOCK
AVALANCHE-JOURNAL, May 22, 2014, available at http://lubbockonline.com/local-news/201405-22/high-plains-water-district-rules-require-metering-no-new-meters.
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Beginning in the late 1990s, even as the Texas legislature was expanding
the rights and responsibilities of GCDs, a group of investors began
buying up substantial land in the Panhandle overlying the Ogallala. 173
The intent behind this investment was entirely transparent: the idea was
to pump up massive amounts of groundwater from the Ogallala and
then to ship this water, via pipelines, to distant and thirsty metropolitan
areas. 174 The justification was equally transparent: in the eyes of the
relevant investors, the groundwater at issue was essentially identical to
oil and ought to be treated in the same way that oil is treated, full stop.
As the lead investor was repeatedly quoted: “Heck, isn’t it
[groundwater] like oil? You have to come back to who owns the water.
The groundwater is owned by the landowner. That’s it.” 175 Similar
views were echoed in the popular media and the legal academic
literature by commentators who had defended the historic dependence
of Texas groundwater law on the characterization of oil and gas law
described in this Article. 176
In fact, for all the reasons suggested in this Article and elsewhere,
regardless of whether the Panhandle water pipeline was a good idea or a
bad one, the groundwater resource at issue was in fact not just like oil,
and there are a host of good reasons to treat the two resources
differently. 177 But by associating their efforts so closely with the stylized
characterization of oil and gas law examined in this Article, advocates
for the Panhandle water pipeline were able to tap into all of the framing,
uncertainty, and optimism biases associated with the tragic crossover
and discussed in Section III.A above. 178 Ultimately, the Panhandle water
173. E.g., Susan Berfield, supra note 15; see also Nicholas E. Arrott, Comment, Caution! T.
Boone Pickens Plans to Permanently Alter Texas’s Landscape Above and Below Ground, from the
Panhandle to Metropolis, 9 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 265 (2008) (collecting sources and providing a
thorough summary of the conflict through 2008).
174. See, e.g., Berfield, supra note 15 (“If water is the new oil, T. Boone Pickens is a modern-day
[Rockefeller,] who hopes to sell [water from the Panhandle] to Dallas, transporting it over 250 miles.”).
175. See, e.g., id. (quoting Pickens).
176. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text.
178. Although this article is the first to label and analyze the tragic crossover from oil and gas law
to groundwater law, and although this article is highly critical of arguments that make use of this
crossover, most of the arguments advanced by Panhandle pipeline supporters were entirely
straightforward, if perhaps misguided or short-sighted. More generally, whether advanced by private
interests, the state legislature, or Texas courts, attempts to use reasoning that depends on the tragic
crossover may be both confused and confusing, and therefore tragically promote both scientific and
social uncertainty, but such attempts are usually not under-handed in any way—indeed, as the
Panhandle pipeline story shows, the efficacy of arguments based on such reasoning depend in part upon
their popular appeal and apparent transparency. The following quote and anecdote provides an example
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pipeline project was dropped, following multi-million dollar purchases
of land and water rights coordinated by Panhandle GCDs, 179 the
intervention by the federal Department of Justice, which was concerned
about potential Voting Rights Act violations related to the creation of
GCDs comprised entirely of employees of the proposed pipeline’s
investors, 180 and the investors’ decision that wind, rather than water,
might be the “new oil” after all. 181
While the Panhandle water pipeline may have been abandoned, it
was not abandoned because of any real failure of the arguments its
advocates advanced about how Panhandle groundwater ought to be
treated and valued. This debate took place soon after Sipriano and the
legislation of the 1990s that provided new authority and responsibilities
to GCDs: a time when many observers predicted that Texas
groundwater institutions would soon decisively reject the rule of capture
and replace it with a new approach more congenial to local and regional
regulation. Nevertheless, advocates of the Panhandle pipeline project
were broadly successful in lower-court litigation related to the
project, 182 and outside of the legal academic literature their arguments
about the equivalence that ought to be drawn between the law of
of the transparent association of such arguments with the tropes and biases associated with the tragic
crossover identified in this Article: “Well[,] if you’re T. Boone Pickens and you’re 70-something years
old, and you say in an open forum that the [local GCD’s] plan for water for 50 years doesn’t interest
[you] because [you’re] not going to be around – then to me that means he wants to sell as much water
as he possibly can today.” Colleen Schreiber, High Court Rules that Landowner Rights Also Include
Groundwater, LIVESTOCK WEEKLY / HILL COUNTRY ALLIANCE (Mar. 8, 2012), available at
http://www.hillcountryalliance.org/HCA/News031912 (quoting Greg Ellis, former general manager
of the EAA and former executive director of the Texas Alliance of Groundwater Districts).
179. See, e.g., Brian Brown, The Last Drop: America’s Breadbasket Faces Dire Water Crisis, NBC
NEWS (July 6, 2014), available at http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/last-drop-americasbreadbasket-faces-dire-water-crisis-n146836 (noting that instead of building the pipeline and
transporting the water to Dallas, “[i]n 2011, [Pickens] sold his water rights for $103 million to 11
water-impoverished cities nearby, including Lubbock and Amarillo”).
180. See, e.g., Dellapenna, supra note 10, at 345–46 (summarizing the Department of Justice’s
opposition to Pickens’s plan “to preclude a water district from restricting his right to export
groundwater by creating a groundwater district in which the only two persons eligible to vote were
his employees, as were the persons elected to the district board”).
181. See id. (noting that the water pipeline investors announced the suspension of the project
in 2008 “ostensibly because of the greater potential profitability of a wind farm project on the land”);
see also Dan Reed, Texas Oilman T. Boone Pickens Wants To Supplant Oil with Wind, USA TODAY,
July 11, 2008, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/2008-0708-t-boone-pickens-plan-wind-energy_N.htm.
182. S. Plains Lamesa R.R. v. High Plains Underground Water Conservation Dist. No. 1, 52
S.W.3d 770 (Tex. App. 2001). For a useful short summary of South Plains Lamesa, its relationship to
the Panhandle pipeline dispute as well as to broader trends in Texas groundwater law, see, for
example, Dellapenna, supra note 10, at 343–45.
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groundwater and the law of oil and gas was never seriously challenged.
The recent developments discussed in Section IV below will likely prove
more significant for the development of Texas water law in the short
term, but in a real sense the example sketched immediately above is
nearly as important, because it illustrates the resonance that the tragic
crossover discussed in this Article can have for Texas groundwater
institutions and the broader public beyond debates that reach the state
legislature or the state’s highest court.
IV. RECENT EXAMPLES OF THE TRAGIC CROSSOVER: EDWARDS
AQUIFER AUTHORITY V. DAY AND BEYOND
The most visible and significant recent examples of the tragic
crossover from Texas oil and gas law to Texas groundwater law occurred
in the course of the Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day case and its
related legislation, 183 which together resolved the issue of individual
rights in groundwater in place long left open by Texas courts and the
Texas legislature. As noted above, around the turn of the twenty-first
century, many academic observers, government officials, and advocates
for greater groundwater regulation believed that Texas courts and the
Texas legislature might definitively reject the rule of capture and allow
greater local regulatory control of private groundwater withdrawals. 184
Advocates of greater regulation and critics of Texas water law were also
buoyed by the fact that Texas courts had begun to note the increasing
idiosyncrasy of their groundwater doctrine. 185 At the same time,
however, the increasing number of GCDs and their increasing activity
led to conflict with property-rights advocates and local landowners who
believed that their rights to capture unlimited amounts of groundwater
was being infringed.
This conflict led to litigation, much of which revolved around the
potential exposure of Chapter 36 GCDs and the Edwards Aquifer
Authority (“EAA”) to takings litigation based on alleged individual
surface landowners’ property rights in uncaptured subterranean

183. 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012); Act of Sept. 1, 2011, Bill Analysis, 82d Leg., R.S., ch.
1207, § 1, sec. 36.002, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 3224 (often referred to as S.B. 332).
184. See supra notes 108–12 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Torres, supra note 10, at 147 (2012) (noting that Day “was decided on a
foundation of groundwater management that has haltingly sought to more closely align multiple
water-rights regimes in Texas”).
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groundwater. 186 In a very short period of time, Day and its related
legislation have shifted the momentum for change that had been
building in previous decades. Moreover, the tragic crossover from oil
and gas to groundwater law has played a central role in that story: such
arguments were repeatedly invoked prior to the Day opinion and its
related legislation, and they were adopted by Day and some of its
pending successor cases, with tragic consequences that will continue to
be felt in the future.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, advocates of greater groundwater
regulation argued that the central issue in these takings suits could be
resolved quickly and easily: in the context of groundwater, the rule of
capture had never implied or entailed individual ownership rights in the
underground resource, so the groundwater regulations at issue could
not have taken any protected property interest. Other advocates of
increased groundwater regulation, less vehement about the inherent
absence of property rights under the rule of capture, nonetheless
suggested that the substantial recent legislation expanding GCD’s
powers and duties weighed against takings liability for most GCD
actions because it reduced any serious investment-backed expectations
that private surface landowners might have in uncaptured subterranean
groundwater. 187 On the other side of the debate, some opponents of
expanded GCD regulation argued that many takings claims against
GCDs acting pursuant to the new legislation ought to proceed, often
drawing upon Texas oil and gas doctrine to advance their conclusion
that Texas courts ought to resolve admittedly ambiguous precedent in
favor of individual ownership of groundwater in place. 188 Similarly, other
advocates of strong individual ownership rights in groundwater in place
also argued that the issue should and already had been resolved by oil
and gas precedent—in other words, that the issue had been settled years
186. McCarthy, supra note 121, at 899 (“The battle line [that was drawn was] based upon an
effort to insulate groundwater districts [from takings litigation when] groundwater in situ is taken for
a public purpose.”). To date, Day is the most significant example of this litigation.
187. E.g., Bill Hankins, Part 5: ‘Rule of Capture’: The Changing Viewpoint, THE PARIS NEWS
(TEX.), Dec. 27, 2007, available at http://texaslivingwaters.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/tlwnews-12-23-07.pdf. This line of argument, which obviously draws upon the investment-backed
expectation standard for regulatory takings set forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), eventually proved to be central to the Supreme Court of Texas’s reasoning
in Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day. See Day, 369 S.W.3d at 839–44.
188. See, e.g., Drummond et al., supra note 10, at 15, 60 (arguing that “substantially altering
the rule of capture . . . presents considerable takings implications for the state” and claiming that “the
last area where oil and gas law provides much needed insight [to groundwater law] concerns the
difference in terminology between the rule of capture and the doctrine of absolute ownership”).
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before, thanks to the kinds of arguments identified in this Article as the
tragic crossover from oil and gas to groundwater law. 189
Among the many takings lawsuits related to these issues and filed in
the early 2000s, the decisive blows were struck in Edwards Aquifer
Authority v. Day, an appeal briefed and argued before the Texas
Supreme Court in 2010. 190 The plaintiffs in Day filed suit after their
permit application for 700 acre-feet of water, submitted to the EAA, was
granted for only fourteen acre-feet of water. 191 The plaintiffs argued that
the denial of their permit request amounted to an unconstitutional
taking: in other words, the plaintiffs argued that groundwater in place
was the property of the landowner and constitutionally protected.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs claimed that such a permit denial amounted
to a taking of their property, which could not proceed without payment
under the federal and state takings clauses. On the other hand, the state,
on behalf of the aquifer authority, took the position that the
groundwater in place belonged to the state prior to capture by the
surface landowner, and therefore, that there were no individual
ownership rights to be taken by the EAA’s permit restrictions.
In other words, the question so long left ambiguous by the Texas
Supreme Court regarding ownership of groundwater in place was
squarely presented by the Day parties. Accordingly, the first issue that
the court had to resolve in Day was whether it had ever resolved the
issue of potential ownership rights in groundwater in place before. 192
In its opinion, the court held that despite claims to the contrary, the
issue had never been squarely presented or decided before: nothing in

189. E.g., Jones & Little, supra note 121, at 588–91.
190. 369 S.W.3d 814.
191. Id. The use of terms of art like an “acre-foot” of water—the amount of water needed to
cover an acre of land with water one foot deep, or 325,851 gallons of water—often complicates
discussions about water use and water regulation, because they involve amounts developed in
agricultural settings that are hard for most people to imagine in familiar terms. ROBERT GLENNON,
WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE FATE OF AMERICA’S FRESH WATERS 32 (2002).
The federal Bureau of Reclamation estimates that one acre-foot of water is enough to supply the
household water needs of a family of four for one year. Dan DuBray, Facts & Information, U.S.
BUREAU
OF
RECLAMATION
(August
19,
2014),
available
at
http://www.usbr.gov/main/about/fact.html. Some local governments, in Texas and elsewhere,
estimate that a family will use less than an acre-foot per year. See, e.g., Facts About Water, CITY OF
PROSPER, TEXAS, available at http://www.prospertx.gov/funfacts.aspx. (estimating that “[o]ne-half
acre foot is enough to meet the needs of a typical family for a year”).
192. See supra notes 77–87, 186–89 and accompanying text (noting the confusion and
ambiguity about this issue caused by the tragic crossover examined here, and collecting arguments
from both sides about whether this issue had already been resolved prior to Day).

1328

03 BRAY.FINAL 1283-1346 (DO NOT DELETE)

1283

10/8/2015 9:51 PM

Texas Groundwater and Tragically Stable “Crossovers”

East itself, 193 nor in any subsequent groundwater opinions, 194 had
resolved whether individual surface land owners owned groundwater
in place. Similarly, the Day court held that nothing in the rule of
capture, which it reaffirmed with gusto, either required or was
antithetical to individual ownership of groundwater in place. 195
Following briefing and oral arguments, Day sat pending before the
Texas Supreme Court for over two years, during which time the
arguments raised before the court continued to play out in public, in
the press, and in legislative hearings. While Day was pending, in 2011
the Texas legislature considered two competing and essentially opposing
bills, both of which purported to clarify the issue of ownership of
groundwater in place left ambiguous in Texas for over a century after
East. In reality, these competing bills essentially advanced the opposing
positions on ownership of groundwater in place advanced by the
litigants in Day and in the other similar takings suits percolating
through Texas courts at the time.
Senate Bill 667 was essentially drafted to preclude individual
ownership of groundwater in place, at least insofar as such rights
might restrict GCDs’ ability to set reasonable limits. 196 As originally
drafted, S.B. 667 would have specified that landowners only had the
“right to seek and attempt to capture groundwater that underlies the
surface of the land,” affirming the rule of capture as a rule of nonliability alone while ruling out any strong individual ownership rights
in groundwater in place. 197 However, S.B. 667 was not enacted. In its
place, the Texas legislature enacted S.B. 332, expressly designed to
rebut the argument, advanced by supporters of expansive GCD
regulations, that individual landowners lacked cognizable property
rights in groundwater in place. Indeed, S.B. 332’s identification with
the litigating position of plaintiffs like those in Day was incorporated

193. See Day, 369 S.W.3d at 826 (“The effect of our decision [in East] was to give ownership of the
water pumped from its well at the surface. No issue of groundwater in place was presented in East.”).
194. See id. (noting that in several “cases since East, we have considered the rule of capture as
applied to groundwater. In none of them did we determine whether the water was owned in place.”).
Among the cases referred to by the Day court were City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton,
Friendswood, Sipriano, and Barshop cases, discussed supra at notes 57–60, 79–86, 103–09 and
accompanying text.
195. Id. at 823.
196. S.B. 667, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011).
197. Id. Senate Bill 667 was introduced by Texas Senator Robert Duncan, who represented a
district in the Texas Panhandle with decades of experience with both GCDs and aquifer depletion.
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in the Bill Analysis itself. 198 As enacted, S.B. 332 amended the Texas
Water Code to recognize, expressly and for the first time, that “a
landowner owns the groundwater below the surface of the
landowner’s land as real property.” 199
Following the revised Texas Water Code after the enactment of S.B.
332, the Texas Supreme Court in Day finally resolved the issue of
ownership in place so long avoided by Texas groundwater institutions.
First, Day reiterated the rule of capture, relying on the chain of cases
stretching back to East and beyond, including the usual quotation to
the formulaic language regarding groundwater’s “secret, occult, and
concealed nature” provided in Frazier v. Brown. 200 Next, Day
recognized, for the first time in Texas, that surface landowners have
property rights in groundwater in place, albeit rights that cannot really
be exercised against other individuals with access to the same
groundwater supply, given Texas’s continued adherence to the rule of
capture. 201 As will be shown at much greater length below, this move
was repeatedly and expressly justified by what this Article refers to as the
tragic crossover from oil and gas law. 202 Finally, based on the foregoing,
Day held that because groundwater in place is constitutionally protected
property of the landowner—at least protected against government
regulation—a governmental entity could not constitutionally “take” a
landowner’s groundwater through the imposition of regulations on
uncaptured groundwater in place without providing compensation. 203

198. In 1904 the Texas Supreme Court in [East] established the rule of capture in
Texas . . . . rul[ing] that a landowner has an ownership interest in the groundwater beneath
[his] property. . . . Recently, landowners’ interest in groundwater below the surface has
come into question in the courts. The argument being made by some GCDs is that the
landowner does not have an interest in the water below the surface until they [sic] capture it.
Act of Sept. 1, 2011, Bill Analysis, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 1207, § 1, sec. 36.002, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws
3224 (codified as amended at TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.002 (West 2011)).
199. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.002(a) (West 2011). Section 36.002(b)(2) makes clear
that the ownership rights recognized by the statute “do not affect the existence of common law
defenses or other defenses to liability under the rule of capture.”
200. Day, 369 S.W.3d at 824–26.
201. See id. at 828–29 (holding that the absence of “common law liability for a landowner’s
unlimited pumping” does not necessarily resolve “the ownership of groundwater in place” because
the relationship between the rule of capture and individual ownership rights in the law of
groundwater is and should be the “same” as in the law of oil and gas).
202. Id.; see also notes 197–211 and accompanying text.
203. Id. at 822 (“[W]e turn to whether Day has a constitutionally protected interest in the
groundwater beneath his property and conclude that he does.”); see also McCarthy, supra note 121,
at 899 (“On February 24, 2012, the Texas Supreme Court ended the battle.”).
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Day attracted national attention 204—although given the enactment
and the timing of S.B. 332, the Texas Supreme Court’s published 2012
opinion in Day was perhaps less surprising than it might have been a few
years earlier, when the tide in Texas courts seemed to be running out on
the rule of capture and away from individual ownership rights in
groundwater in place. Stepping back even a bit further, the core result
in Day—a recognition of some ownership rights in subterranean
groundwater in place—is not, in and of itself, necessarily tragic nor
unusual in American groundwater law. As a recent comprehensive
examination of American groundwater takings law has noted, many
groundwater takings cases in other U.S. jurisdictions that do not follow
the rule of capture have concluded, as did Day, that individual rights to
use groundwater deserve constitutional protection and can, at least in
theory, be enforced by takings suits. 205 And even some advocates of
increased regulation of groundwater believe that water shortages in
Texas and across the United States require not just greater regulation
but also greater reliance on market transactions, and more clearly
defined individual property rights, in order to alleviate current and
future shortages. 206
What makes Day unusual, and particularly tragic, is the way it
reaches this result, by attempting to combine exceptionally strong
individual ownership rights with the rule of capture through the use of
the tragic crossover from oil and gas to water law discussed in this
204. E.g., Owen, supra note 14, at 258–59, 276–77 (noting that Day brought national
attention to groundwater takings, and referring to it as probably the nation’s most prominent
groundwater/takings case). Groundwater takings claims have proven to be tricky for courts to resolve
in many jurisdictions, in part because of the diversity of groundwater law across jurisdictions, but
more importantly because the nature, scope, and elements of individual rights in water have
traditionally been hard to define. E.g., Craig, supra note 10, at 118–19 (“With regard to [this]
issue—if water rights are property rights, what are their defining aspects?—property rights in water
are legitimately viewed as both normatively and pragmatically different from property rights in
land.”); see also Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 351
(1996) (“If water were our chief symbol for property, we might think of property rights . . . in a
quite different way[:] . . . more fluid and less fenced-in; we might think of property as entailing less
of the awesome Blackstonian power of exclusion and more of the qualities of flexibility,
reasonableness and moderation . . . .”).
205. Owen, supra note 14, at 280–82.
206. Compare GLENNON, supra note 10, at 335 (thanking free market environmentalists for
critical comments about his arguments in favor of a regulated market) with, e.g., PETER W. CULP,
ROBERT GLENNON, & GARY LIBECAP, SHOPPING FOR WATER: HOW THE MARKET CAN MITIGATE
WATER SHORTAGES IN THE AMERICAN WEST 14–31 (The Hamilton Project / Stanford Woods
Institute for the Environment 2014) (suggesting, among other reforms, measures to improve the
clarity of individual and collective property rights in water, to minimize transaction costs for water
transfers, and to create and improve market institutions to facilitate water trading).

1331

03 BRAY.FINAL 1283-1346 (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/8/2015 9:51 PM

2014

article. The point will be considered at greater length below, in order
to show the role that the tragic crossover from oil and gas law played
in the court’s relevant reasoning. But before plunging into how the
court arrived at this combination, one can quickly see why this is a
tragic combination: thanks to Day’s retention of the rule of capture,
the individual property rights in groundwater in place recognized by
the court are exceptionally strong with respect to regulatory
interference, but they are of no use against other individuals who wish
to exploit the same groundwater supply. In other words, the property
rights recognized by Day are good only against government regulation
of the resource, though here they are very strong indeed. Thus, these
strong but circumscribed property rights can do nothing to encourage
or improve market-based solutions to water problems; indeed, they
will be actively corrosive to market-based solutions. 207 Accordingly, as
will be seen below, Day is likely to create substantial problems for even
the most modest local and regional regulation of groundwater,
perpetuating the tragic stability of Texas groundwater institutions and
encouraging unsustainable levels of groundwater exploitation.
As with many of the previous examples of the tragic crossover
examined above, Day’s attempt to link the law of groundwater with a
stylized version of the law of oil and gas was straightforward and
attracted swift attention from academics, the popular press, and the
practicing bar 208:
[W]hile the rule of capture does not entail ownership of
groundwater in place, neither does it preclude such ownership.
Although we have never discussed this issue with respect to
groundwater, we have done so with respect to oil and gas, to which
the rule of capture also applies . . . . We held long ago that oil and
gas are owned in place[,] . . . [and] we see no basis in [the]
207. See, e.g., CULP ET AL., supra note 206, at 24 (citing Day and criticizing Texas’s
groundwater law as an example of an open access regime, and pointing out that “[o]pen access to
groundwater thus inhibits the development of real markets for water and distorts the prices we pay”).
208. See, e.g., Wilder, supra note 122; Jennifer Cornejo, Texas Appellate Court Finds a Taking
of Groundwater, Solidifies Formidable Future for Groundwater Districts Across Drought Stricken State,
VINSON
&
ELKINS
WATER
BLOG
(Sept.
17,
2013),
http://water.velaw.com/TexasAppellateCourtFindsTakingGroundwaterSolidifiesFormidableFuture
GroundwaterDistrictsAcrossDroughtStrickenState.aspx (describing Day as “a landmark decision
which held that landowners have an absolute vested property right in place, just like oil and gas, and
a constitutionally compensable interest in it”); William W. Wade, Texas Groundwater, Regulatory
Takings and the Day Decision, MARZULLA LAW (September 19, 2013), available at
http://www.marzulla.com/texas-groundwater-regulatory-takings-and-the-day-decision/
(noting
that Day “equated groundwater ownership to oil and gas”).
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differences [between groundwater and oil and gas] to conclude
that the common law allows ownership of oil and gas in place but
not groundwater. 209

More specifically, by holding that individual surface landowners
have property interests in uncaptured groundwater in place akin to oil
and gas rights—interests that are potentially compensable under
constitutional takings protections—the Texas Supreme Court in Day
recognized a property right without any real private rights to possess or
exclude, and without taking into meaningful account any of the features
of groundwater that distinguish this resource from oil and gas. 210
In other words, Day used the tragic crossover to articulate a new
property right in groundwater, which, thanks to the retention of the
rule of capture, can only be exercised where the state or a local entity
attempts to apply a management or conservation system. 211 It is a
right, therefore, which cannot be affected by drought or by a
neighbor’s efforts to capture the same resource, even though the value
of the right will be affected by such phenomena. And because the
individual rights in groundwater recognized by the Texas legislature
and courts in and after Day do not affect the rights of individual
groundwater appropriators relative to one another under the nonliability aspects of the rule of capture, these rights seem likely to
exacerbate the trend toward over-exploitation long identified in similar
groundwater control systems. 212
Despite its recent vintage, Day has already attracted considerable
criticism. 213 And, indeed, in light of the considerations advanced in
this Article, Day deserves much of the criticism it has received. In one
fell swoop, Day rejects over a century of dramatically improved
knowledge about the state of groundwater in favor of reiterating the
formulaic language of East and its obsolete justifications. 214 While
209. Day, 369 S.W.3d at 828, 831–32.
210. Torres, supra note 10, at 163.
211. See id. at 162.
212. See OSTROM, supra note 12, at 108–09 (describing classic problematic groundwater
scenarios, and noting that in them “[n]o one pumper bears the full cost of full personal actions,” and
thus, “[e]ach pumper is consequently led toward overexploitation”).
213. See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 10 (criticizing Day for retaining the rule of capture, for
undercutting the ability of GCDs to regulate and conserve the shared resource, and for incentivizing
landowners to “race to extract more water faster than one’s neighbors who also overlie the same
groundwater source”).
214. See, e.g., Dellapenna, supra note 10, at 351 (noting that the Day majority did not
“consider the possible relevance of the fact that both the absolute dominion rule and the rule of
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doing so, Day reiterates the rule of capture, widely recognized to have
tragic consequences when applied to groundwater, both generally and
within Texas, despite the apparent inconsistency between the rule of
capture and the strong individual ownership rights in groundwater in
place that Day also recognizes. 215 In other words, Day and the
legislation that virtually compelled its outcome at once “sow[ed]
confusion about the capacity of the state to regulate natural resources,
while ignoring the science that ought to drive policy decisions.” 216
It may be tempting for some readers, especially in light of the
substantial and nearly immediate criticism discussed immediately
above, to read Day and its related legislation as simply additional
examples of the Texas legislature’s and Texas courts’ longstanding
preference for individual property rights and concomitant suspicion of
government regulation that interferes with such rights. 217 Others
might be tempted to reduce Day and the unusually timed legislation
that virtually compelled its outcome entirely to a public choice
story, 218 in which the confusion and short-sightedness that repeatedly
characterize Texas’s approach to groundwater are attributed to a state
legislature and its highest courts that aim to serve moneyed land
developers and energy interests rather than the broader public welfare.
While both of these readings may contain some elements of truth,
neither captures the full story: Day and the legislation that compelled it
are far more interesting, and their consequences far more tragic, than
either a purely reductive public choice account or a straightforward
narrative based on little more than Texans’ alleged anti-government

capture were [historically] based on a pervasive ignorance regarding groundwater rather than an
affirmative decision regarding property rights”).
215. See, e.g., id. at 352–53 (noting the “basic inconsistency in holding that a person has a
property right in underground water that cannot be taken without compensation but that the person
can, by exercising that right, take his neighbor’s property without compensation”). Recognition of
the inconsistency between the rule of capture and the strong individual ownership rights is not
confined to academic articles—other state supreme courts have rejected the inconsistency affirmed by
Day and enabled by the tragic crossover discussed in this Article. See, e.g., State v. Michels Pipeline
Construction, Inc., 217 N.W.2d 339, 347 (Wis. 1974) (“There is a basic inconsistency in saying that
a person has a property right in underground water that cannot be taken without compensation, for
when he exercises that right to the detriment of his neighbor, he is actually taking his neighbor’s
property without compensation.”).
216. Torres, supra note 10, at 144.
217. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
218. For a brief introduction to various contributions to public choice theory, see, for example,
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory
Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988).
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inclinations might suggest. First of all, an account of Day that is based
on little more than Texas’s historical suspicion of government regulation
is insufficiently detailed. As noted above, other courts in other
jurisdictions have recognized individual property rights in groundwater
in place, 219 and other jurisdictions are also marked by a general mistrust
of government regulation. 220 What makes Day unique is the way it also
attempts to retain the rule of capture, and all of the antique
justifications associated with it, by returning to the tragic crossover from
oil and gas law. 221 Similarly, interpreting Day and its related legislation
simply as a story in which well-organized and moneyed interests secured
recognition of their own private rights at the expense of the public weal
misses part of the tragic detail of the opinion and its relationship to past
groundwater decisions. 222
Ultimately, Day and its related legislation are most problematic not
simply for what they do—recognizing individual property rights in
groundwater in place—but for how they do it. Far worse than the actual
result in the case is the way that Day combines very strong individual
property rights, enforceable only against the government, with a
reaffirmation of the rule of capture. This combination is justified by the
tragic crossover examined in this Article, which has historically tended
to feed the problematic framing effects, layered uncertainty, and
219. Owen, supra note 14, at 280–82.
220. E.g., THOMAS FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS? HOW CONSERVATIVES WON
THE HEART OF AMERICA (2004). I take no position on whether anything is, in fact, the matter with
Kansas—Texas provides this article with quite enough to do. My point here is only that Texas
groundwater law is a far greater outlier than Texas’s alleged anti-government ethos, and therefore
any attempt to explain the former primarily by reference to the latter seems likely to be insufficient.
221. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
222. Some recent commentators on Day have suggested that at least some of the Justices on
the Texas Supreme Court who wrote or joined the Day opinion may have embraced Day’s use of the
tragic crossover between oil and gas law and groundwater law out of a desire to enhance the
possibility for additional regulation of groundwater. See, e.g., Amy Hardberger, The World’s Worst
Game of Telephone: Attempting to Understand the Conversation Between Texas’s Legislature and Courts
on Groundwater, 43 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 257, 299–302 (2013). Such a careful reading of the possible
intent behind Day, at least as such intent might be ascribed to some members of the Day court, is
not merely possible but perhaps indeed plausible, especially when one considers that Day was written,
albeit for a unanimous court, by the author of the concurrence in Sipriano. See, e.g., Sipriano v. Great
Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 82 (Tex. 1999) (Hecht, J., concurring) (criticizing the
continued reliance on the “secret [and] occult” reasoning of East, and pointing out that “[t]he
extensive regulation of oil and gas production proves that effective regulation” of subsurface
substances “is not only possible but necessary and effective”). Such a reading is also entirely
consistent with the analysis advanced in this Article above: whatever the intention (or, more likely,
intentions) behind Day, for the reasons given elsewhere in this article, the effects of its reliance on the
crossover from oil and gas law to groundwater law are likely to be tragic.
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optimism biases that have rendered Texas groundwater law so
persistently static. These aspects of Day and its related legislation are
particularly problematic because they seem likely to produce even worse
results in subsequent cases—and although Day was very recently
decided, this has already begun to happen. 223
To date, Day’s tragic impact can be most readily examined in
Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Bragg, 224 another long-running case
involving a takings suit against the EAA. 225 The landowner plaintiffs in
Bragg, longtime owners of commercial pecan orchards in central Texas,
filed a takings suit against the EAA when it granted them a permit for
slightly more than 120 acre-feet of water, substantially less than their
alleged historical use and permit request. 226 Relying heavily upon Day,
in Bragg a Texas appellate court held that the EAA’s permit limitations
worked a taking on the landowner plaintiffs, and that the measure of
takings damages should be based on the value of the landowner’s
property with unlimited access to aquifer groundwater. 227 In reaching
this result, the court in Bragg noted the decades of experience and
ownership that informed the plaintiff landowners’ investment-backed
expectations 228—however, the court did not reach just a few decades
farther back, to the cataclysmic drought of the 1950s, and the impact
that such a drought might have wrought on plaintiffs’ water supplies or
farming operation, nor did it reach to the centuries-old pattern of
recurring drought that marks Texas history and Texas water law. 229 The
223. By worse results, I mean results that continue to perpetuate the tragic stasis of Texas
groundwater law, and that tend to do even more than Day and its related legislation to discourage
GCDs and other similar local and regional bodies from imposing modest regulations designed to
avoid well-known common-pool resource problems.
224. 421 S.W.3d 118 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013).
225. See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying text. The landowner plaintiffs in Bragg filed
suit in 2006. 421 S.W.3d at 126. Even before this case, the Braggs were no strangers to litigation
over groundwater rights. See, e.g., Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Authority, 71 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. 2002).
The previous litigation was one of the many pre-Day cases in which the Texas Supreme Court
declined to address the issue of individual ownership rights in groundwater before capture,
concluding that the EAA did not need to prepare takings impact assessments before adopting wellpermitting rules. Id. at 738.
226. 421 S.W.3d at 126.
227. Id. at 153 (holding that the EAA’s actions resulted in a taking, but that the appropriate basis
for compensation should be the difference between the value of the land “as a commercial-grade pecan
orchard with unlimited access to Edwards Aquifer water” and the value of the land as a commercialgrade pecan orchard subject to the permitted limits after 2005) (emphasis added).
228. Id. at 140–43.
229. For a useful graphical depiction of the recurring pattern of drought that characterizes
Texas history, see PORTER, supra note 126, at 13.

1336

03 BRAY.FINAL 1283-1346 (DO NOT DELETE)

1283

10/8/2015 9:51 PM

Texas Groundwater and Tragically Stable “Crossovers”

matter is presently before the Texas Supreme Court, with briefing
extended into early 2015 230—which means that by the time briefing is
completed in Bragg, the Texas legislature will be back in session. 231
Although the Texas Supreme Court has yet to opine in Bragg, the
case has already attracted substantial attention, largely because both
critics and defenders of recent developments in Texas groundwater law
see the intermediate court opinion as an important, and perhaps
inevitable, extension of the reasoning employed in Day. 232 As with Day,
reactions to Bragg have been sharply polarized, with debate erupting
both within the state and across the country about Bragg’s extension of
Day’s reasoning almost immediately after the intermediate court’s
opinion was issued. 233 While there is broad disagreement about Bragg’s
merits, defenders of Bragg tend to agree with the opinion’s critics that
the plaintiffs’ water needs were not static, but rather likely to increase
over time. 234 Similarly, there is broad agreement between critics and
defenders of Bragg about its likely effects. Many commentators on both
sides of the dispute think that Bragg, as an extension of Day, will force
GCDs to look for new justifications for their regulatory decisions, even
as water supplies come under increasing pressure from drought, climate

230. Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Bragg, Case Number 13-1023, Order of Oct. 22, 2014,
Supreme Court of Texas (setting briefing schedule through January 2015).
231. The Texas Legislature, which meets every other year, will be back in session on January
13, 2015. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE LIBRARY OF TEXAS, Texas Legislative Sessions and Years,
available at http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/sessions/sessionYears.cfm. The timing of both briefing and
the legislative session may prove to be relevant, as they open the possibility for legislative intervention
similar to S.B. 332, discussed supra at notes 195–202 and accompanying text, which virtually
compelled the result, if not the reasoning, in Day.
232. See, e.g., Tiffany Dowell, Did You Know?, TXH2O MAGAZINE, Summer 2014, Texas
Water Resources Institute (noting that the intermediate court opinion in Bragg is “essentially a
logical extension of the Day opinion”).
233. See, e.g., Forrest Wilder, Come and Take It: Court Ruling Dares Regulators To Limit
Pumping, TEX. OBSERVER, Sept. 3, 2013, available at http://www.texasobserver.org/texascourt-upholds-takings-claim-landmark-water-case/ (quoting critics and defenders of Bragg and
Day within Texas and across the country).
234. See, e.g., Jennifer F. Thompson, Texas Court Finds Agency Can’t Deny Pecan Farmers’
Water Rights Without Compensation, LIBERTY BLOG (Pacific Legal Foundation Aug. 29, 2013)
available at http://blog.pacificlegal.org/2013/texas-court-finds-agency-cant-deny-pecan-farmerswater-rights-without-compensation/ (defending Bragg and its recognition of property rights based
on potentially unlimited supply and the rule of capture while noting that “[t]he Braggs knew that
they would need to use more and more water from the Aquifer as their pecan trees matured”). For
Bragg’s many critics, the fact that the plaintiffs’ water needs were not static, but rather increasing in
the face of diminishing supply and historically frequent drought suggests that finding a taking based
on potentially unlimited supply is far too generous to such a takings plaintiff.
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change, and population growth. 235 Moreover, and again despite the
disagreement about Bragg’s overall merits, critics and defenders of the
result and its reasoning tend to agree about the close relationship Bragg
bears to Day—though defenders of Bragg tend to claim that, like Day,
Bragg is a correct return to traditional common-law doctrines governing
subterranean resources. 236
Bragg has been roundly criticized, often by academics within and
beyond Texas, 237 and this criticism will be discussed below. But it is
important first to look at the role that the crossover from oil and gas law
plays in Bragg’s extension of Day’s tragic reasoning. The central issue in
Bragg, and the key to its extension of Day, lies in its approach to the
main issue left unresolved by Day: namely, how to value the property
interest in uncaptured groundwater in place. 238 As discussed above,
defining the property rights in a subterranean resource that has allegedly
been taken by government regulation, and then figuring out how to
measure the value of those rights, are tricky issues, 239 but their difficulty
is compounded by Day’s reliance on the tragic crossover from oil and
gas law. It is difficult, to say the least, to figure out how to value
individual ownership rights in groundwater in place against the
government when those rights have no value against other individuals
under the rule of capture: not least because such ownership rights lack
235. See, e.g., Wilder, supra note 233 (quoting Russell Johnson, author of several texts on
Texas groundwater cited here for the first time at note 9, supra, who argues that after Bragg,
GCDs are “just going to have to adjust to the fact that they can’t say no, they can’t just say this
resource is already stressed”).
236. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 234 (defending Bragg as “an excellent result” for the
continuing protection of “common [law] water rights in Texas”).
237. See Wilder, supra note 233 (quoting Professor Amy Hardberger, who suggested that
Bragg is both “so important and potentially scary” because of its potential as a benchmark for future
takings suits over groundwater in Texas); Robin Kundis Craig, Attempting To Deal Rationally with
Limited Water Supplies Is a Regulatory “Taking” of Private Water Rights, ENVTL. L. PROF BLOG
(Aug. 30, 2013), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/environmental_law/2013/08/;
Dave Owen, Bragg, Takings, and the Economics of Limited Resources, ENVTL. L. PROF BLOG (Aug.
29, 2013), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/environmental_law/2013/08/braggtakings-and-the-economics-of-limited-resources.html.
238. See, e.g., Neena Satija, Lawyers, Policy Experts Weigh In on Groundwater Case, TEX. TRIB.
(Sept. 26, 2013), available at http://www.texastribune.org/2013/09/26/water-lawyers-andexperts-weigh-groundwater-case/ (quoting experts on both sides of the Day-Bragg debate who agree
that the valuation question is the main issue left open by Day and addressed, for good, ill, or a mix of
both, by Bragg).
239. As discussed above in notes 49–54, 71–74, 154–57 and accompanying text, it took oil
and gas institutions in Texas and other jurisdictions decades in the early twentieth century to resolve
this issue, while doing so in a much more straightforward way, making greater use of improvements
in scientific knowledge and greater focus on the unique characteristics of oil and gas.
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any market. But of course this is exactly the mess that Day has created
by using antique precedent and out-of-context principles drawn from
Texas oil and gas law to juxtapose ownership in place rights and the rule
of capture. In other words, identifying and analyzing the tragic
crossover helps to show the nature and the significance of the mistakes
made in Day and Bragg and sheds new light on how those mistakes
were made.
Faced with a difficult situation, the Bragg court compounded many
of the problems presented to it by Day and the legislature. To resolve
the issues presented by the litigants and left open by Day, the Bragg
opinion doubles down on the crossover examined in this Article,
expanding Day’s reliance on oil and gas principles and exacerbating that
opinion’s tragic tendencies. More specifically, to resolve the central issue
posed by the litigants and left open after Day, Bragg begins by expressly
adopting oil and gas law principles, advanced by the plaintiffs, 240 in
order to focus on the value of the subsurface estate that consists of
“‘property’ or a ‘commodity’ that comprise[s] the business of the
plaintiffs.” 241 Having begun by emphasizing the doctrinal similarities
between hydrocarbons and groundwater under Texas law, the opinion
then pivots to emphasize an apparent difference between the two: unlike
a landowner who seeks to extract subterranean oil or gas for its value as
a commodity, the groundwater at issue is not the source of the plaintiffs’
business itself, but rather a means of only instrumental value to the
plaintiffs’ business. 242 Thus, the Bragg court held that groundwater in
such a takings case should be valued in terms of its benefit to a separate
business—specifically, commercially viable pecan orchards, which the
court treated as the highest and best use of the properties, unfettered by
any natural limits on groundwater supply or legal limits under the rule
of capture. 243
At the initial level of analysis, one must see that the reasoning
explored above provides takings plaintiffs with an incredible bonanza,
which greatly, if almost inevitably, extends the tragic crossover reiterated

240. See 421 S.W.3d 118, 150 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013) (“The Braggs . . . rely on oil and gas cases
in which the courts have held that the proper measure of damages should be based on the property
actually taken . . . and we agree . . . .”).
241. Id. at 151.
242. Id.
243. See id. at 150–51 (concluding that “just compensation should be determined by reference
to the highest and best use of the properties, which here are as commercial pecan orchards” supplied
by “the unlimited use of water” before the EAA’s restrictions).
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in Day. Bragg gives such plaintiffs every benefit that can be squeezed
from treating groundwater like oil and gas, exacerbating the biases
surrounding the tragic crossover discussed in this Article. Bragg’s
reasoning begins from the premise that groundwater ought to be valued
in such a case in fundamentally the same way that oil and gas is valued:
for its instrumental value to the individual whose land it is found
underneath. Despite the many differences between the valuation of
hydrocarbons and water, 244 Bragg suggests that both ought to be valued
in the same way.
Bragg then writes away the problems inherent in valuing
groundwater—problems already compounded by Day’s juxtaposition of
ownership in place and the rule of capture—by suggesting that such
groundwater ought to be valued the same way that oil and gas is valued,
for its value to the takings plaintiffs’ business. Here, however, the
opinion pivots to note that it is not the value of the water itself that
should be considered, but rather its instrumental value to the plaintiffs’
business, unconstrained by any natural limitations or any legal limits
given the rule of capture, because the instant value of the water itself, as
valued only by such a takings plaintiff, might be too slight for full
constitutional compensation. In short, it is hard to imagine a more
generous potential regime for takings plaintiffs, nor one more
challenging for regulators seeking to regulate a common pool resource
subject to tragic tendencies: it focuses only on the most optimistic,
short-sighted, and loss-framing valuation of the water to the takings
plaintiffs, and only the takings plaintiffs, without any regard for the
potential value that regulation of such a common-pool resource might
provide, either to the plaintiffs or the community at large. 245
Even Bragg’s defenders have noted that the portions of the opinion’s
analysis explored above are somewhat confusing and possibly confused, in
part because they fail to take into account valuation changes in takings
plaintiffs’ economic activities that are not caused by changes in legal
244. See supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text.
245. More specifically, the reasoning derived from the tragic crossover in Bragg exacerbates
optimism biases by essentially assuming the success of the plaintiffs’ business, based on a relatively
constrained temporal window, in order to determine the appropriate compensation owed the
plaintiffs, thereby ignoring the possibility that resource constraints (such as, for example, a drought
and/or aquifer depletion) might reduce or erase the value of plaintiffs’ enterprise. Similarly, it
exacerbates framing problems by construing the impact of the regulation on the plaintiff landowners
as purely loss-forcing, in terms of the negative value of the authority’s decision on the plaintiffs’
business, thereby ignoring the potential value-enhancing effects on plaintiffs’ land of preserving or at
least extending the supply of accessible groundwater.
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access to groundwater. 246 Bragg’s critics around the country are almost as
numerous as and perhaps even more pointed than Day’s critics, despite its
very recent vintage and pending appeal before the Texas Supreme Court.
More specifically, some of Bragg’s critics have called the property rights it
seeks to secure “illusory” and “unsustainable” because the opinion
ignores a number of key facts, including the natural limits on
groundwater, the limits imposed by the rule of capture, and the water
needs of neighboring cities and ecosystems. 247
Furthermore, other critics have pointed out the incredible guarantee
given to the plaintiff landowners by the opinion—a guarantee of rights
against the government and value far greater than they could have
achieved under the “unfettered competition” created by the rule of
capture alone. 248 Still other critics have suggested that by encouraging
aquifer depletion and restricting local and regional groundwater
regulation that might ameliorate groundwater mining, Bragg will lead
to widespread groundwater mining that will ultimately destroy the value
of land and private enterprise that depend on the water in the first
place. 249 Moreover, some critics have suggested that Bragg’s systematic
errors demonstrate the inability of Texas courts to manage or resolve
groundwater issues, 250 although given the record of the past century, it
is not clear that the Texas legislature should be much preferred to the
courts in groundwater matters.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the most frequent criticism
leveled against Bragg by its critics is that the potential windfalls it
provides to takings plaintiffs look like potentially crippling losses to local
and regional water regulators. 251 In other words, Bragg is likely to

246. See, e.g., Satija, supra note 238 (quoting Mark McPherson and Russell Johnson, who both
support Day and Bragg but suggest that the portions of Bragg analyzed above may cause confusion
and uncertainty, including but not limited to cases where the value of the property changes
substantially for reasons unrelated to access to groundwater).
247. Arnold, supra note 10, at 1046.
248. Owen, supra note 237.
249. See Craig, supra note 237 (arguing that Bragg, in its “attempt[] to elevate historical
water rights over new ecological realities” will lead to over pumping that may “eventually
destroy the value of all private property claims to water (and maybe the value of all private
property, period) in many parts of Texas”).
250. Amy Hardberger, Texas Courts Start To Fill in the Blanks on Groundwater Law, TEX.
LIVING WATERS PROJECT, Sept. 5, 2013, available at http://texaslivingwaters.org/texas-courtsstart-fill-blanks-groundwater-law/.
251. See, e.g., Ross Crow, Municipal Regulation of Groundwater and Takings, 44 TEX. ENVTL.
L.J. 1, 31 (2014) (“[T]he Bragg holding could have a chilling effect on any governmental entity in
Texas . . . including municipalities, contemplating new groundwater regulations or maintaining
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prolong and deepen the tragic stability of Texas groundwater law by
chilling the ability of GCDs and other regulatory bodies to control
overexploitation of diminishing groundwater supplies. 252 To illustrate
this problem, and to show how the cognitive biases associated above
with the tragic crossover are likely to exacerbate this chilling effect, it
may be useful to consider potential takings plaintiffs slightly different
from the farmers and ranchers in Day and Bragg. 253
In recent years, a technique for extracting oil and gas known as
hydraulic fracturing (often referred to as “fracking” or “fracing”) has
become increasingly prominent across the U.S. generally and Texas
particularly, where it has taken on particular importance in high-profile
formations like the Eagle Ford Shale in South Texas and the Barnett
Shale around Dallas and Fort Worth. 254 During the fracking process,
which can use millions of gallons of water, 255 fluids are injected into

existing ones.”); see also Hardberger, supra note 250 (arguing that after Day and Bragg, both the
EAA and many Texas GCDs, the latter of which have a wide range of funding, “have cause for
concern” as they “attempt to do their job under the shadow of possible expensive litigation,” and
that as a result “[g]roundwater and Texans will suffer”); Neena Satija, Texas Groundwater Districts
Face
Bevy
of
Challenges,
TEX.
TRIB.
(Aug.
29,
2013),
available
at
http://www.texastribune.org/2013/08/29/groundwater-districts-beset-increasing-water-/ (noting
that Bragg “has stirred concerns that businesses . . . will use it to threaten legal action if a GCD tries
to limit the amount of water they can pump,” and quoting practitioners who suggest that after Bragg
GCDs “are facing an impossible task”).
252. See Crow, supra note 251, at 31–34. GCDs are afforded some measure of protection
against such suits by provisions of the Texas Water Code that date back to the period in the late
1990s and early 2000s in which the tide seemed to be running out on the rule of capture and in
favor of increased GCD regulation. In particular, Texas Water Code § 36.066(g) provides that a
GCD may recover its attorney’s fees if it prevails in a suit so long as it did not voluntarily intervene.
For this reason, Day and Bragg are unlikely to create a flood of takings litigants, but nevertheless the
prospect of even a few takings plaintiffs with claims inflated, for all the reasons discussed in Parts III
and IV, supra, is potentially quite chilling.
253. Moving beyond the Day and Bragg plaintiffs is in no way intended to slight the
importance, economic or otherwise, of their farming and ranching activities, or the potential impact
that their takings claims may have on GCDs. Nevertheless, an additional example may be useful to
illustrate both the stakes involved in other situations, and the potentially dramatic chilling effect that
Day and Bragg may cause, even beyond the high-six-figure and low-seven-figure dollar values
contemplated in Bragg.
254. McCarthy, supra note 121, at 929–33; see generally Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and
Responses in Fracturing Policy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 729 (2012).
255. Compared to other uses of water, the amount of groundwater used in hydraulic fracturing
is relatively modest, but in parts of the state with high dependence on groundwater and substantial
fracking activity, the amount of water used may be very substantial and even unsustainable. See, e.g.,
Kate Galbraith, As Fracking Increases, So Do Fears About Water Supply, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/us/as-fracking-in-texas-increases-so-do-water-supplyfears.html?_r=0 (noting that “fracking consumes less than 1 percent of the total water used
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geologic formations under high pressure, in order in order to fracture
the formation and enhance oil and gas production. 256 The rapid recent
growth of the process has fueled incredible state, regional, national, and
international economic activity, as well as intense state, regional,
national, and international political controversy about its environmental
and social side effects. 257
At present, whether Texas GCDs can regulate groundwater
withdrawals related to hydraulic fracturing is the subject of some
debate. 258 The Texas Water Code provides that GCDs must provide
exemptions for drilling and production permits for water wells that are
“used solely to supply water for a rig that is actively engaged in drilling
or exploration operations for an oil or gas well permitted by the
Railroad Commission of Texas” so long as the oil and gas permit holder
is responsible for drilling and operating the water well. 259 Opinions
divide as to whether ongoing operations associated with hydraulic
fracturing qualify under the relevant statutory language, 260 and the

statewide,” but in “drilling hotbeds,” the proportion of groundwater may be far greater and
approach unsustainable levels).
256. E.g.,
Hydraulic
Fracturing,
R.R.
COMM’N
OF
TEX.,
available
at
http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/about-us/resource-center/faqs/oil-gas-faqs/faq-hydraulic-fracturing/.
Water makes up most of the hydraulic fracturing fluid. Id. A number of additional additives may be
included in the fracturing fluid or injected into the well, including friction-reducing fluids, materials
used to “prop” open the fractures known as “proppant,” biocides to prevent micro-organism growth
and reduce biological contamination in the formation, as well as compounds introduced to prevent
corrosion or reduce drilling mud buildup. Id.
257. E.g., Wiseman, supra note 254, at 732–36, 738–41. In recent months, state, national, and
international attention regarding hydraulic fracturing controversies have been focused on Denton,
Texas, its recently enacted municipal ban on fracking, and the litigation that has already ensued and
almost certainly will continue to be filed regarding this ban. See, e.g., Suzanne Goldberg, Texas Oil
Town Makes History as Residents Say No to Fracking, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 5, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/nov/05/birthplace-fracking-boom-votes-bandenton-texas. Denton’s ban is far from the first such ban to be filed in the U.S., nor is it the only one
recently enacted, but the town’s location in Texas has given it particular prominence in the broader
debate about hydraulic fracturing and local controls.
258. See, e.g., Galbraith, supra note 255, (noting the ambiguity in Texas law as to whether
GCDs may regulate groundwater wells for hydraulic fracturing through permitting).
259. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.117(b)(2) (West 2014). To qualify for this exemption, the
water well must also be located on the same lease or field associated with the oil and gas-drilling rig. Id.
260. Essentially, the ambiguity and the debate centers on whether: 1) ongoing hydraulic
fracturing counts as “drilling or exploration operations” under the statutory language, which was
drafted before the recent fracking boom; or 2) the exemption ceases upon departure of the rigs from
the relevant lease. Carl R. Galant, In Drought, a Storm Brews: DFCs and the Oil and Gas Exemption,
44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 817, 829 (2012). The relevant statutory language of the exemption provides
that the rig to which water is being supplied must be “actively engaged in drilling or exploration
operations” and that it must be “located on the same lease or field” as the water well. TEX. WATER
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matter has not been definitively resolved by either Texas courts or the
Texas legislature, 261 which considered legislation on the issue during the
last legislative session. 262 Despite this statutory ambiguity, several Texas
GCDs have imposed or are considering imposing permitting controls on
groundwater wells used in hydraulic fracturing operations, 263 and their
interpretation of the relevant provision of the Texas Water Code may
eventually be sanctioned by the state legislature. 264
But even if the Texas legislature were to sanction the possibility of
modest GCD regulation of water withdrawals and injections associated
with fracking, such regulatory activity might well be chilled by the
effects of Day and Bragg. Consider what the bonanza of Day and Bragg
would do to the compensation claim of a potential takings plaintiff
suing a groundwater regulator for controls that affect the exploitation
and recovery of oil and gas rather than a cattle, peanuts, oats, or pecan
operation. Such a damages claim, fueled by the optimism, loss-forcing,
and temporal biases associated with the tragic crossover reiterated in
Day and Bragg, could easily be propelled into the stratosphere, chilling
CODE ANN. § 36.117(b)(2) (West 2014). Put another way, then, this exemption is bounded by both
a temporal (“actively engaged”) and geographic (“same lease or field”) restrictions. Galant, supra, at
829. For a good general summary of the debates in the Texas legislature about the exemption and
the merits of extending it to fracking, see, for example, Kate Galbraith, Texas Senators Discuss
Fracking
Groundwater
Rules,
TEX.
TRIB.,
Apr.
2,
2013,
http://www.texastribune.org/2013/04/02/texas-senators-discuss-fracking-groundwater-rules/.
261. McCarthy, supra note 121, at 929. Some have suggested that Texas courts, if and when
they do rule on the matter, are likely to construe the exemption of § 36.117(b)(2) expansively, and
in favor of hydraulic fracturing operations. See id. (noting that the conflicting interpretations have not
been tested in court, but suggesting that a pro-exemption and anti-regulation outcome would be
likely if tested in court, “[g]iven Texas’s demands for energy in a state where oil and gas is king,” as
well as the tendency of Texas courts to “broadly interpret[] Texas law, including the law related to
the use of groundwater, favorably toward the oil and gas industry”).
262. For a brief discussion of Senate Bill 873, one of the unsuccessful bills in the last legislative
session, which would have confirmed GCDs’ ability to require permits for groundwater wells used in
hydraulic fracturing, see Galbraith, supra note 255, and Galbraith, supra note 260.
263. According to a recent survey by the Texas Alliance of Groundwater Districts, over a third
of its 83 members require permits for groundwater wells used in hydraulic fracturing, and just under
half either require or are considering requiring such permits. Among those GCDs that reported
significant fracking activity, almost two-thirds either require such permits or are considering requiring
such permits. E-mail from Carolyn Cadena, Program Director, Texas Alliance of Groundwater
Districts, to Zachary Bray (Sept. 8, 2014) (e-mail and survey results on file with author).
264. See Stacey A. Steinbach, Legislative Wrap-Up, 83rd Legislative Session, TEX .
ALLIANCE
OF
GROUNDWATER
D ISTRICTS,
available
at
http://www.texasgroundwater.org/pdfs/130730TAGDLegSumWeb.pdf (last visited Aug. 24,
2015) (arguing in favor of GCDs’ ability to regulate groundwater wells under the existing
language of § 36.117(b)(2), summarizing S.B. 873, and recommending that S.B. 873 be used
as a starting point for future debates).
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the ability of modestly funded local and regional groundwater regulators
to impose even minor controls. 265 In other words, while state, national,
and international attention focuses on the debate over whether local and
regional controls related to hydraulic fracturing will be permitted, Texas
groundwater law may remain tragically stable due to the chilling effects
of the crossover enshrined in Day and Bragg, whatever the state
legislature and local and regional regulators may decide to do.
Obviously, this Article’s analysis of Bragg’s merits is broadly in
accord with the criticism of Bragg outlined above. But here as elsewhere
this Article seeks to do more than pile on to the growing mountain of
comprehensive and trenchant criticism already directed at decisions like
Day and Bragg. Such criticism may be thoughtful and well-deserved,
but it is important also to offer a new explanation for why such
decisions seem to recur in Texas groundwater law. Like Day, which it
extends and further problematizes, Bragg does not simply reiterate the
tragic crossover from oil and gas law: it is bound by the crossover as
well. As in Day, the portions of Bragg’s analysis that tend to exhibit
many of the features of tragic stability in commons institutions
identified by previous scholarship are the same portions of the opinion
that are most clearly tied to the tragic crossover from oil and gas law. 266
And thus, like Day, Bragg demonstrates the importance of breaking the
tragic crossover from oil and gas to groundwater law if the latter is to
emerge from its longstanding tragic stasis.
V. CONCLUSION
Extended analyses of commons problems often seem relatively
pessimistic—after all, tragedy is built into some of the core terms and
theories often used to describe such problems. 267 Analyses of
groundwater are no exception to this tendency: the resource is so
essential to so much human activity that potential shortages and

265. Such post-Bragg takings claims might be most eye-watering for potential hydraulic
fracturing plaintiffs, but this is only an example: there are any number of potential plaintiffs beyond
the energy industry who might be able to frustrate and chill even modest groundwater controls by
using the formula fueled by the tragic crossover and analyzed here. This hydraulic fracturing example
was selected in part for its resonance with the widespread popular attention presently being paid to
fracking in Texas, but a similar story might be told about many other types of potential takings
plaintiffs, with businesses that stretch beyond the agricultural activity at issue in Day and Bragg.
266. See supra notes 211–28, 244 and accompanying text.
267. The classic example of this tendency is, of course, Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 168 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
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problems with water institutions often appear to be dire indeed. 268
Much of the foregoing analysis in this Article may seem to fit this
pessimistic tendency: I have described a set of problems many decades in
the making, as well as the stasis of the relevant institutions that might
turn this long-running tragedy into comedy, and in so doing I have
provided a novel account of how commons institutions can come to
grief—or, more accurately, remain in a grievous situation, even when
happy changes appear to be just over the horizon.
Accordingly, some measure of pessimism is appropriate. It would be
a mistake at the end to minimize the problems that the tragic crossover
analyzed in this Article has helped to perpetuate. If the tragic crossover
continues, it will continue to impair the development of effective and
transparent market-based solutions to water shortages in Texas;
moreover, the stasis of Texas’s relevant institutions will continue to
exacerbate the impact of regular and predictable water shortages, as well
as the state’s vulnerability to catastrophic economic collapse in times of
severe drought. Indeed, as the state water plan itself notes, Texas does
not have enough water, and at least in the foreseeable future, the
problem is likely to get worse rather than better. 269
But this Article does, at least, provide the outline of a script that
might lead to a happy ending. If the tragic crossover can be broken, and
if a century’s worth of knowledge about groundwater and the water
cycle are incorporated into groundwater disputes that reach Texas
courts, and if local and regional regulatory bodies are empowered to
provide modest and sensible solutions to well-documented problems
free from over-valued takings litigation, then the story of Texas
groundwater law in the twenty-first century may be very different than
what has come before. If not, then the rest of the series will look much
like the episodes that we have already seen, and the finale will not be
pleasant to watch.

268. See, e.g., REISNER, supra note 63, at 438–39 (describing the “Dust Bowl-sized exodus,” the
“rash of bankruptcies,” and the general “social calamity” that could accompany a collapse in supply from
the Ogallala). For a more recent example of such pessimism regarding the same resource, see, for
example, Nicole C. Brambila, Drying Times: Could the Rapidly Depleting Ogallala Aquifer Run Dry?,
LUBBOCK AVALANCHE J., Aug. 9, 2014, http://lubbockonline.com/local-news/2014-08-09/dryingtimes-could-rapidly-depleting-ogallala-aquifer-run-dry (last updated Aug. 10, 2014) (quoting Lucia
Barbato, associate director at the Center for Geospatial Technology at Texas Tech, for the following,
“When anybody tells me [the aquifer’s supply is] going to last for 50 years, I just laugh”).
269. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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